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This dissertation studies the effect of both personal and national economic evaluations 
and social identity on individual vote choice in both Korea and Taiwan by utilizing and 
improving upon information-processing models developed in social psychology. 
Economic voting literature generally makes a strong claim that economic voting should 
affect individual voting behavior in all contexts. Information-processing models suggest, 
however, that attitudes about certain issues must be available and accessible, and that 
candidates must be distinctive on these issues, in order to have a bearing on individual 
behavior. I explain the varying effects of economic conditions and social identity on 
individual vote choice across elections and individuals in the two countries on the basis 
of changes in the accessibility of attitudes toward economic conditions and social identity 
and the distinctiveness of alternatives. Empirical findings in this dissertation show that 
  vii 
(1) economic voting has a surprisingly limited explanatory power in both Korea and 
Taiwan, (2) individual political preferences are shaped less by self-interest or material 
well-being than by emotional attachment to social identity in a society where ethno-
cultural cleavages predominate politics, and (3) individual voters respond differently to 
short-term economic fluctuations, depending on their levels of education and their 
lifetime economic experiences. My study provides a new perspective on the nature and 
influence of economic conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice by 
accounting for variations in individuals and the political and social context in which they 
are situated.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation is a study of individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. I pay 
particular attention to the effect of economic conditions and social identity on individual 
vote choice in both countries, where identity politics are pervasive, specifically, regional 
identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan. To explain individual vote choice in 
these countries, I utilize the information-processing approach developed in social 
psychology. This introduction is composed of four sections. The first section introduces 
my research questions regarding the influence of economic and identity issues in both 
Korean and Taiwanese elections. The second section briefly presents a psychological 
vote choice model of how preexisting social divisions affect the salience of economic 
conditions and identity issues and thus their effect on individual vote choice. Section 
three states the significance and contribution of my findings. The final section provides 
an outline of the body of the dissertation.  
 
I. Research Questions 
 
 This dissertation addresses three major research questions: How are both 
economic conditions and identity issues (regional identity in Korea and ethnic identity in 
Taiwan) relevant to individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan? Under what conditions 
do economic evaluations or identity issues matter more? What types of voters are most 
likely to be involved in economic voting?  
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The rational choice model of voting behavior assumes that individual actors make 
political decisions on the basis of the calculations of costs and benefits among 
alternatives in order to maximize the utility or self-interest. In particular, a body of 
rational choice literature has emphasized economic voting (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1978, 
1981; Kramer 1971; MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1992). This work argues that 
voters assess their costs and benefits in terms of either their personal or the national 
material well-being and decide whether to punish or reward an incumbent based on their 
assessment (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 
1978; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988).  
Even though economic voting tends to be a widely accepted model for explaining 
individual vote choice across countries, there is little consistent and strong empirical 
evidence to support the economic voting theory. Economic voting suffers from what is 
known as the “instability dilemma,” which indicates that the effect of economic 
conditions varies among countries and elections (Alvarez, Nagler, and Willette 2000; 
Anderson 2000; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).1 In the Taiwanese 
Legislative Yuan election of 2001 (Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou 2003) and the Korean 
presidential election of 2002, for example, the incumbent parties prevailed despite 
deteriorating economies. How do we explain these outcomes?  
Furthermore, how can we explain the particular significance of regional and 
ethnic group identity on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan after 
democratization and remarkable economic success? Modernization theory assumes that 
                                                 
1 See Lewis-Beck (1988) and Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) for a comprehensive review of controversies 
on economic voting. 
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urbanization, universal education, and the development of transportation and 
communication should diminish regional and ethnic divisions in a society (Inglehart 
1997; Lerner 1958). Contrary to the arguments of modernization theory, economic and 
political development in both Korea and Taiwan resulted in wider regional and ethnic 
divisions (Cho 1996; Diamond 2001). This project investigates why social identity 
became salient and thus influenced individual vote choice after democratization and how 
preexisting social divisions mediated the effect of economic conditions and social 
identity on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. I suggest that individual political 
perspectives are shaped not by self-interest or personal material well-being but rather by 
pre-adult socialization and emotional attachment to social identity in societies where 
ethno-cultural divisions dominate politics.   
Finally, few studies of economic voting have dealt with the heterogeneity of the 
electorate in regard to economic voting, even though not all individuals care equally 
about economic conditions or have the ability to recognize the political relevance of 
personal and national economic conditions (Duch 2001; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006). 
Individuals differ in their economic experience, which results in diverse interpretations of 
the current economic situations (Higgins and King 1981). People also vary in their ability 
to manage information. Some people are better than others at integrating various pieces 
of information on the state of both their personal and the national economy into a 
coherent political view (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). 
Therefore, I suggest that individual variation in education and lifetime economic 
experience modifies the effect of economic condition by making differences in attitude 
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availability and accessibility regarding economic conditions, which will be defined in the 
following section. In short, the research questions this dissertation answers will provide a 
better understanding of the nature and influence of economic conditions and identity 
issues on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan.  
 
II. Information-Processing Approach of Individual Vote Choice 
 
 Economic and sociological models do not fully explain whether sociological or 
economic factors matter more in a particular time and place when these factors compete 
each other to influence individual vote choice. Utilizing the information-processing 
approach, this dissertation develops a theoretical framework that explains how two sets of 
causal factors—economic factors emphasizing economic conditions and sociological 
factors rooted in social identity—determine individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan.  
 The information-processing approach assumes that attitudes must be available and 
accessible to bear on individual perceptions, judgments, or behavior (Aldrich et al. 1989; 
Bargh 1988; Fazio and Williams 1986). Under the assumption of the information-
processing approach developed in social psychology, I hypothesize that economic 
conditions and/or identity issues affect individual vote choice only when attitudes about 
these factors are available and accessible to voters. Availability refers to whether voters 
have formed an attitude about a particular issue, while accessibility is related to how 
readily the stored attitude can be utilized for political decisions (Aldrich et al. 1989; 
Higgins 1989; Higgins and King 1981). Much salience literature also suggests that a 
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candidate’s position and emphasis on an issue mediates the effect of an issue on an 
individual’s vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960; Carmine and Stimson 1989; Page 1978; 
Page and Brody 1972; Petrocik 1996; Pomper 1972). I argue, therefore, that economic 
conditions and social identity are more likely to influence individual vote choice when 
candidates emphasize a distinctive position on identity issues and their differences on 
economic performance.  
 To sum up, I suggest that the issue concerns of both citizens and candidates, as 
well as the distinctiveness of the candidates, shape the nature of a society’s political 
competitions and thus individual vote choice. Therefore, attitudes about economic 
performance and social identity must be available to an individual’s memory. Given that 
those attitudes are available, accessibility and distinctiveness are the key mediating 
factors that determine the importance of economic and identity issues to individual vote 
choice. The more accessible and distinctive the issues are the better chance they have of 
affecting individual vote choice. An information-processing approach makes it possible 
to study varying effects of economic conditions and identity issues across elections and 
for individuals on the basis of changes in the availability, accessibility, and 
distinctiveness of the individual factors.  
  My study also argues that preexisting social cleavages based on social identity in 
both Korea and Taiwan deeply affect whether attitudes about certain factors are available, 
accessible, and distinctive. That is, after the authoritarian regimes in each country ended, 
political elites in each country exploited social identity—regional identity in Korea and 
national identity in Taiwan—to differentiate themselves through the development of 
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parties on the basis of social identity. Identity politics after democratization created a 
context that mobilized identity-based voting but muted economic voting. I analyze 
multiple elections in both countries in order to examine the effect of economic conditions 
and identity issues on individual vote choice. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the 
individual voter. This dissertation shows that economic voting has a surprisingly limited 
explanatory power in both countries, and that preexisting social divisions rooted in social 
identity can become politicized in ways that trump economic voting.  
 
III. Significance and Contribution 
 
 My project is unique and significant in terms of both its theoretical and 
methodological contributions. Theoretically, this project provides a better understanding 
of individual vote choices, focusing on psychological processes rather than outcomes. 
This dissertation offers a new perspective on the nature and influence of economic 
conditions and identity issues on individual vote choice by taking account of not only the 
availability and accessibility of an attitude but also the distinctiveness of the candidates 
and pre-existing social cleavages as a source of issue salience. Additionally, this study 
examines how far the economic voting model travels by testing the model in the specific 
contexts of Korea and Taiwan, where the existence of identity issues, economic success, 
and a one-party dominant system complicates the economic voting model. 
Methodologically, my research applies both in-depth contextual analysis and rigorous 
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statistical analysis to Korean and Taiwanese vote choices, whereas quantitative studies 
have been dominant in previous voting behavior literature.  
 
IV. Chapter Outline 
 
 This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical 
framework to explain how preexisting social divisions shape individual political 
perspectives and thus affect the salience of attitudes about economic conditions and 
identity issues, which influence individual vote choice. I also provide an overview of 
previous voting behavior models and discuss their limitations in answering my research 
questions. Finally, I present my hypotheses to be tested against the empirical cases of 
Korean and Taiwanese elections.  
 Chapter 3 explains how social divisions between groups shaped the political arena 
after democratization in Korea and Taiwan. I pay particular attention to how group 
consciousness affected elite strategy and party systems that, in turn, influenced attitude 
availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness regarding economic conditions and group 
identities—specifically, regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan.  
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the two empirical cases of Korea and Taiwan, 
respectively. In the two chapters, I build the case for how emotional attachment to social 
identity rather than economic concerns shape individual political decisions when ethno-
cultural conflicts prevail politics in a society. First, I provide evidences of the 
accessibility, availability, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and group identity 
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in each country. Second, I introduce the research design, including data, variables, and 
models, that are used to test the effects of economic evaluations and group identity in 
each country. Third, I analyze three presidential elections in each country and present 
empirical results that show the dominance of identity-based voting rather than economic 
voting. Finally, I provide the implications of my findings on the effect of economic 
evaluations and group identity in future elections.  
Chapter 6 investigates the varying effects of economic conditions among 
individual voters in Korea and Taiwan. Individuals vary in their levels of education and 
lifetime economic experience, which influence attitude availability and accessibility of 
economic conditions, as well as the ability to differentiate the candidates. This chapter 
shows that people with more education have better cognitive skills that allow them to 
properly attribute the responsibility of national and personal well-being to government 
policies. On the other hand, the less educated find it hard to link their personal prosperity 
to governmental actions. In addition, individual lifetime economic experience under a 
one-party dominant system also influences the way individuals respond to short-term 
economic changes.  
 Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of the previous empirical chapters and offers a 
comparative perspective on the findings. I also discuss implications of this study on 
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My dissertation examines both when and how group identity and economic 
conditions have influenced individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. To address this 
subject, I have elaborated a psychological theory of individual vote choice by revising 
information-processing models. My theory suggests that voters respond to factors that are 
more available, accessible, and distinctive than variables that are less so.  
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I review previous 
theories of individual vote choice, specifically sociological, social-psychological, and 
rational choice models. In section two, I develop a psychological theory of individual 
vote choice. Finally, in section three I generate several major hypotheses from my 
theoretical arguments that I will test against several empirical cases of elections in Korea 
and Taiwan. Research design, including data, measurements of variables, and methods, 
will be provided in each empirical chapter (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).  
 
II. Various Vote Choice Models 
 
Three main approaches have been forward to explain individual voting behavior. 
The first is the Columbia model, which focuses on sociological or demographic factors 
such as socioeconomic status (SES), religion, race/ethnicity, and area of residence as 
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determinants of political preferences (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954). The 
second is the Michigan model, which emphasizes social-psychological factors, such as 
party identification, their attitude toward salient issues, and their image of the candidates 
(Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Markus and Converse 1979). The third is the 
rational choice model, which highlights the calculus of costs and benefits of voting for 
one party’s candidate instead of another (Downs 1957; Hinich and Munger 1997). Even 
though these models have accounted for general patterns of voting behavior, they have 
been less than satisfactory in explaining why a specific model has more or less 
explanatory power in a specific context. This section provides an overview of what 
previous voting behavior models have explained and what they have not fully accounted 
for in order to show how my approach can compensate for their shortcomings. 
 
1. The Sociological (Columbia) Model 
The sociological, or Columbia, model of voting investigates the pattern of vote 
choice among different groups of voters distinguished by class, gender, age, education, 
region, religion, and race (Berelson et al. 1954; Lane and Ersson 1987; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Manza and Brooks 1999). According to this model, political decisions are 
influenced not only by one’s political beliefs but also by one’s social position (Berelson 
et al. 1954). Similarly situated people are expected to vote alike; people who share the 
same social characteristics usually share some of the same political interests and 
objectives. This model also finds that voters are most susceptible to the persuasion of 
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primary groups, such as family, friends, and co-workers, since people consider primary 
groups to be more trustworthy and have more frequent contact with them. In short, this 
model assumes that individual political opinions and decisions are shaped by the people 
around voters. Individuals in each social group thus tend to behave as a “unit,” rather 
than as individuals.  
The sociological model establishes a useful theoretical framework to explain 
voting behavior, especially group voting. However, by focusing on static demographic 
variables, this model has been unable to explain drastic electoral changes (Campbell et al. 
1960; Kinder and Sears 1985; Dalton and Wattenberg 1993). In other words, the model 
does not explain changes in group preferences. More importantly, this model has not 
addressed differences in individual preference within a group or the psychological 
foundations of group preferences. Finally, it does not explain why the prominence of 
certain social characteristics varies in different countries and across elections.  
 
2. The Social Psychological (Michigan) Model 
The social-psychological model, or Michigan model, was the first to attempt to 
encompass psychological notions to explain electoral decisions. Campbell et al. (1960) 
maintain that psychological factors, such as voters’ party identification, attitudes toward 
salient issues, and the images of the candidates are the main determinants of individual 
vote choice. Under this model, those factors function as information filters that maintain 
cognitive consistency by reinforcing one another. Party identification, however, is more 
likely to affect attitudes toward candidates, issues, and groups, rather than the factors 
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because party identification, the psychological attachment to a party, persists longer than 
issues and candidates (Campbell et al. 1960; Markus and Converse 1979). In addition, 
party identification is considered an easy and reliable, as well as reasonable, cue since 
parties tend to place themselves on an ideological spectrum and do not deviate much 
from it (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Downs 1957). 
Unlike the sociological model, this model provides a psychological foundation of 
individual vote choice. Furthermore, party identification seems to predict individual 
voting behavior quite well, at least in the advanced Western countries in which a stable 
party system exists and most voters recognize the distinct platforms of each party. 
Particularly, there is little doubt about the significance of party identification in U.S. 
elections (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Miller 1991). The importance of party 
identification, however, is difficult to apply across different countries. Not only do many 
new democracies have unstable party systems, but parties in these countries do not 
always represent clear ideologies or issues. In short, many voters in such countries are 
less likely to have firm party identification, and thus party identification will not be an 
accurate determinant of individual vote choice.  
Nonetheless, the social-psychological model provides a new perspective on the 
significance of other variables, such as social groups, issues, and ideology, on individual 
vote choice (Lau 1986; Hamill et al. 1985). Social group theorists, for example, pay more 
attention to group identification rather than objective membership and offer 
psychological grounds for group voting (Conover 1984, 1988; Koch 1994). Like party 
identification, group identification, as an individual’s psychological attachment to a 
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group, functions as a perceptual screen through which individuals view politics (Conover 
1984). Despite its contribution of integrating a psychological perspective into politics, the 
Michigan model does not explain how different psychological factors are transposed into 
the political arena and to what extent they become relevant to individual political 
decisions in specific electoral contexts. 
 
3. The Rational Choice Model 
 In the tradition of V.O. Key (1966) and Anthony Downs (1957), the rational 
choice model emphasizes cognitive and rational aspects of voting behavior. According to 
this model, voters behave rationally in politics, consciously calculating the costs and 
benefits of their vote choice in order to maximize their utility. Under this model, rational 
actors base their political decisions on “issue proximity”—how close voters’ issue 
positions are to the candidates’ issue positions—or retrospective/prospective evaluations 
of candidates—how the candidates have performed or will perform (Downs 1957; Fiorina 
1978, 1981; Hinich and Enelow 1984; Hinich and Munger 1997; Kramer 1971; Key 
1966). In short, this model argues that voters respond to stimuli involving issues, 
government performance, and the evaluation of candidates and make sophisticated 
decisions according to their self-interest.  
It is well known, however, that many voters are neither interested in politics nor 
knowledgeable about government structure and political figures, not to mention 
substantial policy issues (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Butler and Stokes 1974; Converse 
1970; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Harrop and Miller 1987; Luskin 1987). Large 
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portions of the electorate lack both factual knowledge and meaningful beliefs or “true 
attitudes,” which Converse (1970) calls “nonattitudes.” It is not always easy for voters to 
figure out and compare candidates’ and parties’ issue positions with their own. Much of 
the literature on rational choice, therefore, has emphasized economic factors or individual 
evaluations of incumbent economic performance as the main determinant of individual 
vote choice (e.g., Downs 1957; Erikson 1989, 1990; Ferejohn 1986; Fiorina 1978, 1981; 
Norpoth 1996). Because the economic voting model relies on intuition or “gut 
responses,” it requires very little of voters. Most of the information that voters use for 
their political decisions is, as Popkin notes, actually obtained as a “by-product” of 
activities in their daily lives (1991, pp. 22-3). As long as voters know who the 
incumbents are and how they feel about changes in their well-being, they can make 
reasonable decisions on politics. This body of work shows, at least with regard to the 
U.S. and other Western countries, that the better the economy, the more votes go to 
incumbents, while a poor economy means fewer votes for the incumbents (Alvarez, 
Nagler, and Willette 2000; Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 1978; Gomez and 
Wilson 2001; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Voters punish or 
reward incumbents on the basis of perceived gains or losses in either their personal or 
national material well-being.  
 Economic voting models, however, suffer from a so-called “instability dilemma,” 
which indicates that the significance of economic conditions on individual candidate 
preferences varies from country to country and from election to election (Alvarez, 
Nagler, and Willette 2000; Anderson 2000; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; 
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Paldam 1991). Findings on the effects of economic conditions differ depending on the 
level of analysis (vote share vs. individual vote choice) and kinds of economic indicators 
(e.g., inflation, unemployment, income, or individual perceptions of national/personal 
economic conditions). Scholars also disagree on whether voters react to past events more 
than to future ones, or vice versa.  
Lewis-Beck (1988) and Powell and Whitten (1993) explain variations in 
economic voting by taking account of political institutional variables, which affect 
“clarity of responsibility” (e.g., coalition complexity) and “incumbent alternatives for 
dissent” (e.g., a viable opposition party). One of their findings is that the more political 
parties are in a coalition government, the weaker the economic voting will be. Political 
institutional factors, however, do not explain election-to-election and individual-to-
individual variations of economic voting within a country. Furthermore, the institutional 
explanations overlook how important economic issues are at the time of elections in 
individual countries. They instead assume that economic concerns are always important 
valence issues to most individuals in most places and most elections. Lin (1999), 
however, criticizes ahistorical studies of economic voting in the U.S. Using a time-
varying parameter regression model, he takes historical contexts into account in the 
economic voting model and finds that the effects of economic events on American 
elections have changed over time as the society gradually moved from a pre-industrial to 
an industrial stage. In other words, contrary to the conventional wisdom that economic 
conditions are one of the strongest predictors of individual voting behavior in most places 
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and times, it is hard to generalize the effect of economic conditions, even in the Unite 
States. 
The instability of economic voting in Western countries provides little sense of 
how this approach might apply to electoral choices in new democracies. Most economic 
voting studies on nonwestern countries, on Latin America and Eastern Europe, in 
particular, examine the relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes 
only during economic crises (Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Pacek 1994). 
That is, it is not only hard to generalize the effect of the economic conditions on election 
outcomes in nonwestern countries but also to compare the effect of economy in those 
countries with the effect of the economy in Western countries, which have more or less 
stable economies (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Pacek 1994).  
 To sum up, the most common shortcoming of previous voting behavior models is 
that they do not offer a clear answer for when and why particular factors become 
important in determining individual vote choice in specific contexts. There are variations 
in the explanatory power of specific factors across elections and countries, and as well as 
among individuals, but voting behavior literature has not sufficiently explained the 
variations. It is within this context that the information-processing approach becomes 
useful. The integration of social and cognitive psychology into the study of political 
behavior makes significant contributions to understanding attitude formation, 
information-processing, and decision-making (Iyengar 1993). By focusing on how people 
receive, store, and retrieve political information, social and cognitive psychology can 
help answer why certain factors have different effects on electoral preferences across 
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countries and elections and, more importantly, among different individuals. The next 
section develops a psychological theory of vote choice that suggests that the availability, 
accessibility, and distinctiveness of attitudes about both economic conditions and group 
identity are necessary conditions for those attitudes to influence individual vote choice. 
 
III. Information-Processing Approach of Individual Vote Choice: Identity Politics 
and Economic Conditions 
 
In this section, I argue that there are at least three mechanisms that account for the 
variations of the effects of economic conditions and group identities on individual vote 
choice: availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness. Availability is whether or not some 
particular knowledge of an issue exists in memory and whether people have formed an 
opinion about that issue (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Higgins 1989; 
Higgins and King 1981). Accessibility is defined as the readiness of stored knowledge or 
attitudes to be retrieved from memory (Aldrich et al. 1989; Higgins 1989). 
Distinctiveness refers to the extent to which the candidates differentiate themselves from 
each other in terms of their attitudes toward a particular issue. While the information-
processing approach focuses on attitude availability and accessibility, I suggest that 
economic concerns and group identity have a greater impact on individual vote choice 
when attitudes toward these objects clearly differentiate the candidates.  
Since the publication of The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Strokes 1960), the social-psychological model of vote choice has contributed to providing 
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various predictors of electoral choices, such as party identification, ideology, evaluation 
of incumbent performance, as well as attitudes about particular issues, candidates’ 
personalities, etc. Realizing that voters are far from having complete and perfect 
information to make well-informed political decisions, social-psychology literature has 
focused on heuristics or schemas that voters rely on to decide candidate preferences. 
Social psychologists maintain that people who are not well informed about politics can 
nonetheless make reasoned choices by using heuristics or judgmental shortcuts (Miller 
and Malenchuk 1986; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1991). This idea 
goes back to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) “cognitive heuristics,” which posits that 
low levels of sophistication do not mean low levels of rationality, since there are many 
alternatives to factual information (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).  
Popkin (1991) provides a comprehensive explanation of how less informed people 
can make reasoned political decisions. He argues that people learn from their own 
experiences of daily life, the media, and political campaigns. Even when people have no 
information at all about a candidate or issue, there is no lack of cues. People rely on the 
opinion of friends, family, and opinion leaders. He also points out the importance of party 
identification. Miller and Malenchuk (1986), as well as Popkin (1991), also emphasize 
candidate schemas. They argue that personality characteristics, such as competence, 
integrity, and reliability, enable people to make inferences about a candidate’s expected 
performance and internal dispositions. They claim that voting based on personal 
characteristics is not irrational or superficial but is related to candidates’ issue positions 
and future performances and may be even more stable than voting based on parties or 
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issues. In short, the study of heuristics suggests that varied categories of variables help 
voters to make political decisions. Nonetheless, this body of literature has paid little 
attention to when and how a specific category of variables influences individual vote 
choice. 
Rather than focusing on the general impact of attitudes on behavior, information-
processing researchers started to investigate under what conditions (or when) and which 
(or how) attitudes guide behavior (e.g., Bargh et al. 1986; Chaiken 1987; Fazio 1986; 
Fazio and Williams 1986; Fazio et al.1982; Fazio, Herr, and Olney 1984; Fazio and 
Zanna 1981; Zanna and Fazio 1982).2 Zanna and Fazio (1982) refer to the When? 
question—identifying variables that moderate the correlation between attitude and 
behavior—and the How? question—the process by which attitudes lead to decision-
making and behavior. 
Integrating these previous social-psychological model of voting behavior, my 
research involves both the when and the how questions, to take into account of both 
situational variables that mediate the relationship between attitudes and behavior and the 
processes by which attitudes guide decision-making, specifically vote choice. The crucial 
assumption of the process approach is that certain attitudes must first be available and 
then accessible from memory to influence perceptions, judgments, or behavior (Aldrich 
et al. 1989; Bargh 1988; Fazio and Williams 1986; Fackler and Lin 1995; Fiske and 
Taylor 1991; Lin 1999). The availability of an attitude is whether people are at least 
aware of the existence of an issue. The availability is also relevant to the “familiarity” of 
                                                 
2 See a brief review by Cooper and Croyle (1984) for debates on the attitude-behavior relationship. 
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the issues (Campbell et al. 1960). Unawareness or unfamiliarity about economic issues 
will result in a null effect of economic conditions on election outcomes. Lin’s studies on 
the effect of economic conditions and corruption on American elections, for example, 
show that American voters did not form attitudes about economic conditions and 
corruption during pre-industrial periods and the early 1900s and thus these factors did not 
determine election outcomes (Fackler and Lin 1995; Lin 1999). More information about 
the economy and corruption, on the other hand, brought economic voting and voting 
based on corruption. In short, to bear on candidate preferences, attitudes must be 
available. Without awareness, the accessibility of the issue is zero since there is nothing 
to retrieve from memory about the issue.  
Once attitudes exist, the attitudes must be accessible in order to guide behavior 
(Fazio 1986; Higgins and King 1981). Accessibility is one of the most important factors 
in determining the strength of the connections between attitudes and later behaviors. 
Much of the literature on attitude accessibility measures attitude accessibility using a 
response time (e.g., Bargh et al. 1992; Fazio 1986; Fazio et al. 1982; Lavine et al. 1996). 
The more quickly an attitude is expressed, the more accessible it is. According to 
accessibility theory, the accessibility of an attitude is decided by the frequency and 
recency of activation, links to other attitudes, and the subjective importance of the 
attitude (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Higgins and King 1981; Krosnick 1989; Lodge et al. 
1991). In other words, an attitude is more likely to influence individual vote choice when 
it is more recently or more frequently activated, more strongly related to other attitudes, 
and more important to voters.  
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In addition, I argue that the degrees of distinctiveness between the alternatives 
presented to a voter contribute to the explanation of how strongly attitudes affect 
behaviors. If voters cannot differentiate among the candidates in terms of the candidates’ 
stance on an issue, that issue will not have much influence on electoral choice (Aldrich et 
al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972). 
Candidates generally emphasize issues that could help them and deemphasize issues that 
might hurt them in elections (Petrocik 1996). If candidates think that taking a clear 
position on an issue might hurt their popularity, they avoid talking about it or they take 
the position that most voters already hold. Page and Brody (1972), for example, show 
that a salient issue, the Vietnam War, could not influence voting in the 1968 U.S. 
presidential election because both candidates, Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, took 
ambiguous or similar positions on that issue. Accessible or salient issues at the time of 
election cannot affect individual electoral preferences unless candidates distinguish 
themselves from each other on those issues. In short, the determinants of voting behavior 
in a society are salient issues that allow the voter to clearly discriminate between parties 
or candidates (Aldrich et al. 1989; Hetherington 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page 
and Brody 1972; Petrocik 1996; Pomper 1972). The greater the accessibility of certain 
issues and the greater the perceived difference between candidates, the greater the 
influence will be of those issues on individual vote choice.  
Therefore, at least three necessary preconditions—availability, accessibility, and 
distinctiveness—should be met for economic conditions and group identities to have a 
bearing on individual electoral decisions in Korea and Taiwan. First, these issues must be 
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available in individuals’ memory. Attitude availability of economic conditions or identity 
issues consists of cognitive and evaluative components in that individuals should have an 
opinion about the issues and be aware of political relevance of them (Campbell et al. 
1960). The political relevance component is related to attribution of responsibility, which 
assumes that economic conditions influence electoral decisions only to the extent that 
voters attribute responsibility for conditions to governmental actions (Anderson 2000; 
Feldman 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Iyengar 1991; Lau and 
Sears 1981; Powell 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). If the electorate does not associate 
good or bad economic conditions with incumbent candidates or parties, attitudes about 
economic conditions are not available and thus do not affect individual vote choice. 
Group identities are available when people are aware of group differences and recognize 
that a party or a candidate represents a particular group.   
The availability of opinions about economic conditions and group identity alone 
does not guarantee that these issues will have a substantial impact on individual vote 
choice. The second condition is that the opinion must be accessible, or ready to be 
retrieved. Accessibility is related to the subjective significance of issues since important 
issues are more likely to be activated, to be relevant to other important values, and to 
create intense opinions (Aldrich et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Higgins and King 
1981; Krosnick 1986, 1989). That is, for economic conditions and identity issues to be 
more accessible, they must bear more importance than other issues for individual voters 
in Korea and Taiwan.  
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Third, the distinctiveness of candidates in terms of economic performance and 
group representativeness is equally important. If voters cannot distinguish among 
candidates in terms of an issue, that issue cannot influence electoral choice (Aldrich et al. 
1989; Campbell et al. 1960; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Pomper 1972). The 
distinctiveness of voter’s choices may not be as important as the other two conditions for 
voting based on evaluations of incumbent economic performance. Economic voting, 
retrospective voting in particular, is about rewarding or punishing incumbents according 
to their economic performance. In other words, voters have little to compare between but 
instead decide whether to accept or reject the status quo (Fiorina 1981).  
Under certain circumstances, however, voters are reluctant to replace incumbents 
when they have experienced short-term economic recession under the current 
administration. Voters might not withdraw support for an incumbent when the risk 
related to voting for the opposition may offset the pay-offs associated with punishing the 
incumbent (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; Duch 2001; Magaloni 1999; Przeworski 1991). 
This is particularly true in countries in which opposition parties have little record to show 
their capability of handling the economy. In a one-party dominant system, for example, 
no party but the incumbent has held power. Thus, opposition parties have never been 
tested as a governing party. Korea and Taiwan were once one-party dominant systems. In 
both countries, voters knew little about opposition parties, while they had considerable 
information about the incumbent party. A large information asymmetry between the 
ruling and opposition parties may prevent voters from voting based on the incumbent’s 
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economic performance by increasing the risk of voting for an opposition party (Aldrich 
and Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999).  
For economic conditions to have substantial effects on individual vote choice, 
therefore, it is necessary for voters to experience the alternation of power between 
parties. By the same token, for identity-based voting, parties have to identify themselves 
with particular groups and show that they put their promises to particular groups into 
policy or practice. As the sociological model explains, however, if the party system is a 
reflection of social divisions, it is not very difficult for voters to differentiate the parties 
or candidates. The latter case usually provides the stronger association between parties 
(or candidates) and groups. In either case, however, group identity has a greater effect on 
individual vote choice when parties (or candidates) more strongly identify themselves 
with particular groups. For economic conditions and social identity (regional identity in 
Korea and national identity in Taiwan) to influence individual vote choice, voters must at 
least be aware of the existence of these issues or be divided by them. Furthermore, they 
must consider such issues important, and political parties or candidates must clearly 
distinguish themselves from each other on these issues.  
 
1. Source of Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness: Social Identity 
 Without considering social and political contexts, however, we cannot ascertain 
why certain attitudes are available, accessible, and able to differentiate the candidates. 
Distinctive social characteristics shape the nature of a society’s political competitions and 
thus affect the factors voters tend to weigh most heavily (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). 
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Using Hays’s (1975) “community-society” continuum, for instance, Lin (1999) argues 
that distinctive characteristics between community- and cosmopolitan-oriented societies 
bring about a variation in attitude availability. The political perspectives of voters living 
in a preindustrial society are different from those of voters situated in industrial society. 
Likewise, I contend that the availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of attitudes are 
affected by the existence of divisive social cleavages. Particularly, vote fragmentation on 
the basis of social identity determines what attitudes are available, accessible, and 
distinctive in a society.  
Social cleavages provide a source of conflicts among groups and voter alignments 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Manza and Brooks 1999). A cleavage refers to a division of 
social members into different subsets of individuals, groups and organizations among 
which conflict “potentially” exists (Choe 2003, p. 7; see also Rae and Taylor 1970; 
Flanagan 1973; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lane and Ersson 1987; Moreno 1999). 
According to Lipset and Rokkan, contemporary political divisions reflect two historical 
revolutions: a national revolution and an industrial revolution. Ethnic, regional, and 
linguistic cleavages emerged out of the national revolution and class cleavages resulted 
from the industrial revolution.  
My dissertation focuses on social divisions along ethno-cultural faultlines. Ethno-
cultural cleavages are closely related to emotionally-charged individual identity (Hays 
1975; Markus and Mackuen 1993; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Sears 1993; Sears et al. 
1980). Thus, the main driving force of ethno-cultural cleavages is symbolic (Hays 1975; 
McCormick 1974; Lin 1999). Contrary to the self-interest assumption that individuals are 
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only motivated by immediate material and personal gains, symbolic politics suggests that 
people are deeply provoked by “remote and abstract political symbols” (Sears 1993, p. 
113; see also Sears and Funk 1991; Young et al. 1987). I maintain, therefore, that in a 
society where ethno-cultural divisions dominate politics individual political orientations 
are shaped not by self-interest or personal material well-being but rather by emotional 
attachment to social identity and embedded social values.  
The existence of social cleavages rooted in identity—regional identity in Korea 
and national identity in Taiwan—has influenced elite strategies and party formation, 
which in turn make attitudes toward social identity and economic conditions more or less 
available, accessible, and distinctive in both countries. After democratization, political 
elites in these two countries politicized social identity by building political parties based 
on region in Korea and national identity in Taiwan. In paying considerable attention to 
social identity, the so-called “priming” and “agenda-setting,” political elites created the 
issue that voters thought most about and the criteria by which voters evaluated 
government and political actors (Iyengar and Kinder 1985, 1987; Iyengar, Peter, and 
Kinder 1982; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Under this circumstance, attitudes about social 
identity are chronically available and accessible, while the availability and accessibility 
of attitudes toward economic conditions tend to be subject to the extent to which social 
identity is deemphasized and individuals view the difference between parties in terms of 
economic performance. In short, my study focuses on existing social divisions as sources 
of issue availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness rather than on election campaigns 
or individual differences. 
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2. Heterogeneity of the Electorate 
Most behavior models have treated individual voters as homogeneous. Economic 
voting models are no exception, assuming that the population will respond to economic 
changes by rewarding the incumbent for good times and vice versa (Duch 2001; Duch, 
Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001; 2006). Information-processing 
models, however, imply that the attitude availability and accessibility of economic 
concerns differ among individuals, as well as across nations. Some people attribute the 
responsibility for economic fluctuations to the government but others do not. Some 
people consider economic conditions important, while others give priority to other issues. 
Furthermore, some voters perceive differences between parties or candidates, while 
others do not. I posit that, even within a given population, individuals vary in attitude 
availability and accessibility regarding economic conditions and in the perception of 
party differences on economic performance because of different levels of political 
information and lifetime economic experience. 
Cross-national variation of the effect of economic conditions raises the question 
of heterogeneous economic voting behavior (Gomez and Wilson 2006; Lewis-Beck 1983, 
1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993). Scholars have paid 
particular attention to institutional differences to explain the variations across countries. 
Lewis-Beck (1988) argues that “diffusion of responsibility” and “incumbent alternatives 
for dissent” modify the effects of economic conditions. In other words, the number of 
political parties in the governing coalition affects how clearly voters can assign the 
responsibility for economic conditions. He concludes that more political parties in the 
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governing coalition leads to weaker economic voting. Powell and Whitten (1993) make a 
similar argument by stating that “the clarity of responsibility” mediates the linkage 
between economic conditions and voting behavior. In other words, the easier the 
attribution of responsibility, the stronger economic voting will be.  
Even though institutional differences do not explain heterogeneous economic 
voting behavior among individuals, the logic of the clarity of responsibility can be 
applied to individual heterogeneity of economic voting behavior. Most notably, Duch 
(2001) and Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006) argue that voters vary in their ability to 
clearly attribute the responsibility of economic changes to government. While some 
people acquire a large amount of information and can integrate various pieces of 
information into a belief system, some people acquire little information and cannot make 
sense of more complex or various kinds of information (Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983; 
Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Politically well-informed voters can easily link between 
governmental actions and national and personal economic conditions, while the 
attribution is much difficult for the less politically informed.  
Some scholars argue that sociotropic voting based on evaluations of national 
economic conditions is stronger among the informed, while pocketbook voting based on 
evaluations of personal economic situations is more likely among the less informed (Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1996; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Mutz 1992; Mutz and Mondak 
1997). Gomez and Wilson (2001, 2006), however, challenge the conventional wisdom by 
making the case that pocketbook voting is more common among the informed than 
among the less informed. They contend that pocketbook voting requires more cognitive 
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process for voters to connect personal financial situations to government economic policy 
than sociotropic voting. A nation’s prosperity can be easily attributed to government, 
while personal well-being cannot. I also suggest that sociotropic voting is more prevalent 
than pocketbook voting among the less-informed. I contend, however, that the well-
informed are involved both in sociotropic and pocketbook voting since they can assign 
the responsibility of both personal and national economic conditions to the government. 
Furthermore, levels of political information are overlapped with other individual 
characteristics. According to Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), the overall pattern of 
information distribution overlaps in characteristics with the pattern of socioeconomic 
status. In general, they find that “men are more informed than women; whites are more 
informed than blacks; those with higher incomes are more informed than those with 
lower incomes; older citizens are more informed than younger ones” (pp. 156-7). 
Therefore, interactive relationships between information and economic conditions can be 
transferred to interaction effects between other demographic characteristics and economic 
evaluations. 
I also expect that an individual’s lifetime economic experience will mediate the 
effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice. Lifetime economic experience 
has a particular significance in Korea and Taiwan. The two countries experienced one-
party dominance under the authoritarian regimes and even after democratization. The 
dominant parties did not lose their ruling party status until recent elections. People in the 
two countries experienced remarkable economic development under the dominant parties. 
It was hard for opposition parties to unseat the incumbent party with strong economic 
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records. Magaloni (1999), for example, attributes the persistent dominance of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico to its overall good economic 
performance. Even though Mexican voters suffered serious economic downturns in the 
1980s, they did not respond to the economic fluctuation. In other words, individuals who 
enjoyed prosperity under a dominant party were less likely to punish the incumbent party 
even when they witnessed a short-term economic decline (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; 
Magaloni 1999). This implies that not only long-term prosperity offset a short-term 
economic loss but also that voting for an untested opposition party seemed too risky to 
voters. The dominant party system also implies the lack of a viable opposition party. On 
the other hand, if voters do not witness much economic success under dominant party 
rule, they do not face heavy risks by voting for an opposition party. Therefore, voters in 
this situation are expected to be more involved in economic voting. 
Information-processing models not only make important contributions to the 
understanding of attitude formation and decision-making, but also help explain the 
dynamics and stability of electoral behaviors by paying attention to the interaction 
between individual predispositions and contextual factors (Iyengar 1993; Taber 2003). 
My research shows that the distinctiveness of parties or candidates in terms of economic 
performance plays a significant role in explaining heterogeneous economic voting 
behavior across elections in both Korea and Taiwan. Meanwhile, identity-based voting 
tends to be persistent because preexisting social divisions based on identity are 
chronically available and accessible, as well as distinctive by providing a foundation for 
party formation and realignment in both countries. These case studies also demonstrate 
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that the experiences of political change and economic adversity have not strengthened 
economic voting by themselves, suggesting the limited generalizability of economic 
voting and the importance of socio-contextual factors such as regional and ethnic 
identity. Finally, my study suggests that individual differences in education and lifetime 





1. Main Hypotheses:  
H1. Economic conditions have a greater chance to affect individual vote choice when 
they are more accessible to voters. 
H2. Group identity is more likely to influence individual vote choice when it is more 
accessible to voters.  
H3. Economic conditions have a better chance to influence individual vote choice when 
voters perceive differences between the candidates (or parties) in terms of 
economic performance. 
H4. Group identity has a greater impact on individual vote choice when voters clearly 
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2. Heterogeneity Hypotheses: 
H5. Pocketbook evaluation is more likely to influence vote choice among the more 
educated, while sociotropic evaluation has a greater impact on vote choice among 
the less educated.  
H6. Sociotropic evaluation is less likely to affect vote choice among voters who 

















  33 
Chapter 3. Democratization, Group Identity, and Economic Conditions 




 Researchers have recognized that issue availability and accessibility play an 
important role in an individual voter’s decision-making process and these two factors 
have helped to explain which individual campaign issues were important in each election 
(e.g., Abramson et al. 1994; Aldrich et al. 1989; Fazio 1986; Page 1978; Pomper 1989, 
1993). While electoral contexts, such as campaigns and candidates, have been identified 
as sources of issue salience, voting behavior scholars have not paid much attention to 
preexisting social divisions that constrain issue development and salience by shaping 
individual political perspectives within a society.  
 In this chapter, I demonstrate how social cleavages caused by identity have 
shaped politics after democratization in both Korea and Taiwan and thus determine the 
attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions and of 
group identity—regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan—that affect 
individual vote choice. I pay particular attention to how social cleavages are transposed 
into the political landscape and influence elite strategies and party systems that have 
contributed to determining salient issues in the two countries. The first section of this 
chapter addresses the rise of regionalism in Korea along with the democratization of 1987 
and the development of Korean political parties characterized by personalization and 
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regionalization, which not only led to volatile party systems but also maintained one-
party dominance in Korea. The second section explores the prominence of national 
identity in Taiwanese politics after Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s and the 
development of Taiwanese political parties characterized by one-party dominance. 
 
II. Democratization, Regional Cleavage, Party System, and Economic Conditions in 
Korea 
 
1. Democratization and Regionalism 
 Socioeconomic status, the relationship between church and state, and postmaterial 
issues, beyond region, ethnicity, and personality, tend to structure the party system in 
many advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 2002; Diamond 2001; Inglehart 1990, 
1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In Korea, regionalism has been one of the most 
prominent issues since Korea achieved economic and political maturity. This section 
introduces various explanations for the prominence of Korean regionalism. More 
specifically, I examine how existing regional cleavages became a foundation for party 
building and realignment as mobilized by political elites into electoral politics in Korea. 
 There are three main explanations for the rise of regionalism in Korea after the 
democratization of 1987 (Cho 1997; Choi 1999, 2001). The first is the political-economic 
approach that posits that Korean regionalism grew out of regional discrepancies in 
economic and political power between the southeast region of Kyongsang and the 
southwest region of Cholla (Ahn and Jaung 1999; Cho 1993; Choe 2003; Choi 1993a, 
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1993b; Sohn 1996; Kang 2003). This explanation argues that under the Kyongsang-based 
presidents from Park Jung-hee to Kim Young-sam (1961 to 1998), people from 
Kyongsang had political and economic advantages over people from Cholla in both the 
political and economic domains. Thus, scholars define Korean regionalism as the reaction 
of the Cholla region to Kyongsang hegemony (Choe 2003; Hwang 1996).  
The second explanation is based on rational choice theory. Cho (1996, 1997, 
2000) best articulates this position in concluding that regional voting is a result of rational 
choice by voters, who believe they will get returns in allocation of economic and political 
resources for electing their hometown candidates (1996, 1997, 2000). Rather than treating 
Korean regionalism as an emotional and pre-modern phenomenon, Cho argues that if the 
power structure is organized around the discrepancy between regions, it is reasonable for 
voters from an excluded region to vote exclusively for their regional candidates.  
The third explanation is political mobilization theory, which states that 
regionalism is mobilized by political parties and politicians who exercise their leadership 
over their regions (Ahn and Jaung 1999; Cho 1993; Choe 2003; Choi 1999). This 
approach maintains that Korean regionalism is politically constructed, rather than a result 
of intrinsic regional differences, which is the case of regionalism in most other countries 
(Choe 2003; Morriss 1996).  
However, these approaches do not fully explain some of the following questions: 
Why did regionalism become salient only after 1987? Why have other regions, which are 
as disadvantaged as Cholla, not shown the same strong regionalism that Cholla has 
shown? Finally, what factors have caused Korean regionalism to shift from competition 
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among Cholla, Chungchong, Kyongbuk, and Kyongnam to competition between Cholla 
and the rest (Lee, G. 1998)? To fully explain the rise and nature of regionalism after 
democratization, one must take account of elite strategic mobilization of regionalism and 
group consciousness. Regionalism appeared earlier than the 1987 democratization and 
has grown over the years.3 Early regionalism, however, was different from regionalism 
after the 1987 democratization for several reasons. Early regionalism, for instance, was 
not associated with political parties but with individual candidates. Furthermore, it was 
momentary rather than enduring (Kim and Koh 1972; Lee, G. 1998). On the other hand, 
current regionalism has not only lasted over 15 years but has also played a critical role in 
party alignments in Korea.  
 After Chun Doo-Hwan’s authoritarian regime allowed the formation of opposition 
parties in 1987 and agreed to have a democratic presidential election, political elites, in 
particular the “three Kims”—Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pil—
mobilized dormant regional conflicts for several reasons. First, Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Young-sam, as figures in the vanguard of Korean democratization, lost ground on the 
issue of anti- versus pro-democratization after democratization was achieved by the 
soldier-turned-politician, Roh Tae-woo. Second, when these two Kims broke from their 
party to separately run for the presidency in 1987, they could not separate themselves 
from each other in terms of their political careers and ability to govern. Third, as a 
divided country between Communist north and anti-Communist south, the South Korean 
government strictly implemented anti-Communist policies that ruled out any kind of 
                                                 
3 See Table AI-1 in Appendix I for parties’ vote shares by region from 1952 to 2002. 
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progressive party and prevented labor unions from participating in politics. Fourth, Korea 
was a homogeneous society in terms of language, culture, and ethnicity (Cho 1996; Kim 
and Koh 1972; Morriss 1996). Finally, relatively little socio-economic inequality was 
created amid the rapid economic development of the country. All these factors hindered 
the development of new political issues and ideological differences among parties. Under 
the circumstances, political elites from different parts of Korea—Kim Dae-jung from 
Cholla, Kim Young-sam from Kyongsang, and Kim Jong-pil from Chungchong—
strategically utilized regionalism to create political cleavages. More important, the split 
of the two Kims before the 1987 presidential election fragmented political parties, 
politicians, and citizens by region. Since this time, the power struggle between political 
leaders from Kyongsang and those from Cholla has made the two regions a battleground 
in every election since democratization (Choe 2003; Kang 2003; Sohn 1993). 
Stronger regionalism in Cholla has been explained by strong group consciousness 
of the citizens of Cholla, which is defined as “a politicized awareness, or ideology, 
regarding the group’s relative positions in society, a commitment to collective action 
aimed at realizing the group’s interests” (Miller, Gurin, and Gurin 1978, p. 18; see also 
Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981). This strong group consciousness was 
constructed by their unique experience in the democratization process, as well as by their 
charismatic political leader, Kim Dae-jung. Striving for democratization during the 
transition from the dictator Park Jung-hee to the dictator Chun Doo-hwan, hundreds of 
college students and citizens in Kwangju, which was a central city in Cholla, were killed 
by government troops—the so-called Kwangju massacre of 1980 (Lee, C. 1981). 
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Kwangju and other adjacent towns in Cholla were totally isolated from other regions and 
from the press. With no help from outside, the citizens of Cholla had to unite to survive, 
becoming ‘a fate community’ sharing a common destiny (Choi 1999). The identity as 
Cholla citizens was strengthened by their political leader, Kim Dae-jung, the most 
prominent political figure who promoted Korea’s democratization. Arrested, tortured, and 
almost killed by the authoritarian regimes controlled by Kyongsang political and military 
elites during the 1970s and 1980s, Kim Dae-jung became a symbol of democratization 
and Cholla.  
The grand party merger of 1990 between Roh Tae-woo’s ruling Democratic 
Justice Party and two opposition parties—Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic 
Party and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican Party—strengthened the group 
consciousness of Cholla people by leaving out Kim Dae-jung’s Cholla party, the Party for 
Peace and Democracy. The merger reinstated the perception that Kyongsang’s political 
and military elites tried to perpetuate their political power by eliminating any possibility 
of Cholla’s citizens gaining power (Choi 1999; Lee, C. 1981). The merger further divided 
Korea into “two nations”—the Cholla region and the rest—by leaving out the Cholla 
party (Lee, N. 1998; Sohn 1993). 
In addition, Kyongsang political and military elites created a stereotype of Cholla 
citizens as rebellious and gang-like and Kim Dae-jung as a traitor supporting the North 
Korean communist regime. This negative image of people from Cholla and the region’s 
political leaders elicited hatred and hostility from people of other regions (Lee, N. 1998). 
Table 3-1 provides evidence of the enmity against people from Cholla. The study shows 
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that Cholla people were considered the least likable as a spouse or a business partner. 
Their likeability was even lower than that of people from North Korea. As a result of the 
political use of regional cleavage, Korean regionalism has divided into Cholla versus 
anti-Cholla. Because Korean regionalism is both closely related to group identity and 
emotionally charged, the real stake in Korean politics for most voters has been an 
emotionally symbolic one, involving political power rather than self-interest or personal 
material well-being (Kang 2003). The reinforcing feature of candidates and regions 
implies that the more charismatic the regional leaders or candidates, the stronger the pull 
of regionalism. 
 
Table 3-1. Likeability of a Person from a Particular Region as a Spouse or a Business 
 Partner  
 
Region Observation Mean Std. Deviation 
Seoul and Kyunggi 1158 5.007 1.058 
Kangwon 1149 4.899 1.088 
Chungchong 1148 4.895 1.097 
Kyongsang 1152 4.873 1.166 
Cheju 1145 4.707 1.113 
North Korea 1133 4.400 1.342 
Cholla 1155 4.285 1.451 
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2. Kyongsang-Party Dominance and Personal Parties  
 Political parties play important roles in operating democracies by organizing 
competition, crystallizing interests, and forcing citizens to ally themselves to a particular 
interest (Aldrich 1985; Key 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sniderman 2000; Wattenberg 
1990). In other words, they institutionalize conflicts and advance stability in government. 
They also provide shortcuts or symbols that people can easily recognize (Wattenberg 
1990; Zaller 1992).  
 Political parties in Korea, however, are quite different from those in consolidated 
democracies. Under the authoritarian regime prior to 1987, political parties in Korea were 
government apparatuses used to provide the government with legitimacy. In other words, 
even the opposition parties were formed and controlled by the government to rubber-
stamp government actions. Since democratization in 1987, political parties have 
developed into electoral apparatus to help ensure their leaders’ election. Political bosses 
not only formed and dissolved political parties but also built up and broke down 
coalitions for electoral purposes (Choe 2003; Kim and Koh 1972; Morriss 1996, 1998).4 
As a result, political parties in Korea have been volatile and have not represented 
different ideologies or various issues.  
 In spite of its volatility, the Korean party system was once classified as a one-
party dominant system until 1997. Even after the democratization of 1987, Korea did not 
experience a typical “founding” election in which power shifted from the previous 
authoritarian regime to a totally new democratic one. The ruling party candidate under 
                                                 
4 See Table AI-2 in Appendix I for changes in party system in Korea from 1948 to current. 
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the previous authoritarian regime won the first democratic presidential election. Each of 
the ruling parties—from the Liberal Party established by President Syngman Rhee in 
1948 to the current Grand National Party (GNP)—has been based in the same region, the 
southeast of Kyongsang, and has experienced continuity in both ideology and 
personalities (Solinger 2001). Until the 1997 presidential election, the ruling parties had 
never lost control of the presidency or Congress. 
 The main opposition political leaders known as the “three Kims had dominated 
Korean politics during the last 30 years. The first two Kims fought together for 
democratization against the military and authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and 
Chun Doo-hwan (Morris 1996). Kim Jong-pil was a member of the military coup led by 
General Park in 1961 and founded the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) under 
President Park’s regime to control the military and to monitor civilians. He also served as 
prime minister from 1971 to 1975. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung cooperated to 
achieve democratization but could not reach an agreement on a single candidate for the 
1987 presidential election, the first “true” democratic election since General Park’s coup 
in 1961. In order to run for the presidency, the two Kims split from the New Korean 
Democratic Party (NKDP), and formed their own parties: the Reunification Democratic 
Party (RDP) led by Kim Young-sam; and the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) by Kim 
Dae-jung. The split of the two Kims resulted in electoral defeat of the democratic forces 
against Roh Tae-woo, the ruling party presidential candidate and former military partner 
of President Chun. The result of the 1987 election also implied the incomplete departure 
from the previous authoritarian regime and a delay of democratic consolidation. 
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 Even though Roh won the presidency, the governing party failed to get the 
majority in the Parliamentary election of 1988, which brought the first divided 
government in the history of Korean politics. The governing party regained its dominance 
through a merger of political parties. To overcome difficulties under the divided 
government, President Roh pushed a grand party merger in 1990, a coalition between 
Roh Tae-woo’s ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition parties: Kim Young-
sam’s Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-pil’s New Democratic Republican 
Party. They formed a massive majority ruling party, the Democratic Liberal Party, 
controlling 217 of 299 seats in the legislature (Oh 1999). The grand alliance evoked 
criticism from the public since it was seen as an electoral strategy rather than a truly 
shared policy platform (Oh 1999; Park 1990; Kihl 1991). As a result, Kim Dae-jung’s 
Party for Peace and Democracy, supported mainly by the Cholla region, was left as the 
only opposition party. 
When Roh Tae-woo finished his term in 1992, Kim Young-sam became the 
candidate of the ruling party and won the 1992 presidential election in a contest against 
Kim Dae-jung. Kim Jong-pil left the party in 1995 to found his own party, the United 
Liberal Democrats (ULD). After a short retirement, Kim Dae-jung returned to politics 
and formed a new party, the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP). President Kim 
Young-sam also launched his own party, the New Korea Party (NKP), and tried to break 
himself from the former soldier-turned-president, Roh Tae-woo. Launching these new 
parties, however, did not indicate changes in key members or constituents but were rather 
a symbolic gesture for a fresh start. In short, the NKP inherited most of the personalities 
  43 
and policies from dominant parties of the past, and was based on support from the 
Kyongsang region.  
Even though the 1997 presidential election was a competition between the two 
Kims—Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil—and Lee Hoe-chang, it was like the previous 
competitions between the “three Kims” in 1992. The opposition parties—Kim Dae-jung’s 
Democratic Party (NCNP) and Kim Jong-pil’s Unification National Party (UND)—
established an electoral alliance just before the election and agreed to nominate Kim Dae-
jung as their presidential candidate. Kim Dae-jung promised he would nominate Kim 
Jong-pil as the prime minister if he won the election. Even though the two Kims were at 
opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, their personal aspirations for power 
outweighed their ideological differences. Kim Young-sam could not run for the 
presidency again but his influence remained strong. To get the most votes from the 
Kyoungsang region, Kim Young-sam’s home, Lee Hoe-chang, the presidential candidate 
of the NKP, needed Kim Young-sam’s support. However, Lee Hoe-chang relaunched his 
own party, now named the Grand National Party (GNP), to detach himself from the 
devastating economic failures under Kim Young-sam’s administration. As a result of 
both the economic crisis and the coalition among the opposition parties, the ruling GNP 
failed to gain the presidency and Kim Dae-jung became the first opposition leader to 
assume the presidency. The GNP, however, still held majority in Parliament.  
 Until the 2002 presidential election, the “three Kims” exercised a great influence 
on Korean politics. They formed and rebuilt parties and made and remade coalitions to 
realize their political goal of winning the presidency. As a consequence, voters faced 
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different parties every election and recognized individual candidates better than political 
parties. Parties did not mean much for Korean voters since these parties did not 
differentiate themselves from each other over issues and ideologies. Since the country’s 
division into Communist north and anti-Communist south in 1948, the extreme leftists 
lost their footing in the south (Han 1969). In other words, most Korean parties have been 
positioned in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Ideological differences thus have 
not been meaningful enough for voters to decide their vote choice. Therefore, most votes 
in the elections between 1987 and 2002 were cast for the candidate rather than the party. 
Parties get their support through the popularity of their leader (Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002). 
This is partly confirmed by the post-election surveys conducted by the Institute for 
Korean Election Studies (IKES) in 1992 and 1997 and by the Korean Social Science Data 
(KSDC) in 2002, which studied the factors that respondents considered when they chose 
their candidate. At least 44 percent of respondents in each election answered that 
candidates, including their personal characteristics and political career, were the factor 






                                                 
5 The meaning of candidates’ characteristics is ambiguous. They could indicate personal qualities such as 
competence, integrity, and reliability, or personal characteristics and charisma such as health, age, wealth, 
and military experience (Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malenchuk 1986). 
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Table 3-2. Factors Respondents Considered For Their Vote Choice in 1992, 1997, and 
2002 (%) 
  
Factor 1992 1997 2002 
Candidates 
Characteristics 










Candidates’ parties 13.6% 6.0% 8.5% 
Policies/ Issue platforms 29.1 13.7 23.5 
Candidates’ hometowns N/A 2.7 1.3 
Other 13.4 4.8 3.5 
N 1195 1200 1326 
Source: The data for the 1992 and 1997 results are from the Institute for Korean Election Studies: 
the 14th Presidential Election Study, 1993 and the 15th Presidential Election Study, 1997. The data 
for the 2002 results are from the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC). 
 
 To sum up, the political party system in Korea is characterized by personalization, 
which creates volatility in parties, as political leaders consider parties their personal 
property and form and dissolve them for their own convenience (Ahn and Jaung 1999; 
Lee, G. 1998; Lee, G. and Lee, H. 2002). Despite frequent changes of parties (usually 
only in name), most Korean voters recognized the connection between the “three Kims” 
and their respective parties. Electoral collaboration of political elites had also maintained 
the Kyongsang-party dominant system.  
 
3. The Economy and Regional Identity 
 Until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Korean economy enjoyed remarkable 
prosperity. As one of Asia’s “Four Tigers,” which also includes Hong Kong, Singapore, 
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and Taiwan, Korea has adopted the growth- and export-oriented economic strategy and 
achieved rapid modernization and industrialization since the 1960s. Behind the 
substantial successes, however, existed tight controls of the government on the economy 
under the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun.  
 After General Park took over the government by coup in 1961, he established the 
Economic Planning Board (EPB), which planned and implemented a program of rapid 
industrialization based on exports (Wolf 1962). The Board under the Park’s regime 
launched four Five-Year Economic Development Plans between 1962 and 1981. The first 
two plans recorded 8.3 % and 11% of average economic growth, respectively, and the 
third economic plan (1972-1976) reached 16.5% economic growth by turning its interest 
to heavy and chemical industries and by investing in steel, machinery, shipbuilding, and 
electronics (Oh 1976). Even though the Korean economy shrank during the oil crisis of 
the 1970s, the state-led economic plans not only totally transformed Korea from an 
agricultural to industrial society but also brought 8.1% average economic growth. 
Succeeding Park, Chun Doo-hwan, the second soldier-turned-president, launched the fifth 
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan in 1981 to stabilize the economy after 
Park’s assassination in 1979 (Suh 1982). The average economic growth at the time was 
8.7%. Both authoritarian regimes employed hostile policies toward labor unions to keep 
workers’ wages low and to stay internationally competitive.  
 Since the democratization of 1987, the government has focused on liberalization, 
recording 7.7% average economic growth in the 10 years before the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997. In 1998 Korea experienced the first negative economic growth in over 18 years 
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at -6.9 %. Korea recovered from the crisis very quickly, recording 9.5% economic growth 
in 1999 but growth fell to 3.8% in 2001.6 Even with the remarkable economic success, 
the relatively uneven distribution of economic wealth between the Kyongsang and Cholla 
provinces during the industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s strengthened the formation 
of regional identity. The state-led economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s was launched 
by the military dictators, who were from the Kyongsang province. These authoritarian 
regimes focused their industrialization projects on their own home province, while 
systematically marginalizing the Cholla province from economic development. This 
uneven economic development made the Kyongsang province highly industrialized and 
wealthy, while the other provinces remained largely agricultural and underdeveloped. 
The uneven distribution of economic wealth effectively fortified the feelings in Cholla of 
relative deprivation, which in turn reinforced the cleavage of regional identity. 
 The significance of regional divisions in Korean society and politics demonstrates 
that individual political perspectives have been shaped by regional predispositions, which 
function as an information filter, and thus attitudes toward regional identity are more 
available, accessible, and distinctive than any other attitudes. Furthermore, the presence 
of regional political elites and parties make regional identity more accessible and 
distinctive. Additionally, the one-party dominant system that existed until 1997 and the 
government-led economic policies made economic conditions available because of easy 
attribution of responsibility for economic conditions. However, uneven distribution of 
wealth perceived by the Cholla people contributed to strengthening conflicts between 
                                                 
6 Statistics for the annual economic growth are found at the Bank of Korea (http://www.ecos.bok.or.kr). 
See Figure AII-1 in Appendix II for the annual economic growth rate in Korea from 1953 to 2005. 
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Cholla and Kyongsang, which resulted in the stronger salience of regional identity. 
Furthermore, one-party dominance undermined the distinctiveness of parties in terms of 
economic performance. No opposition party had governed Korea until 1997. Voters did 
not have any information or certainty about the capability of opposition parties in 
handling the economy. That is, economic conditions were better able to differentiate 
parties or candidates after the first alternation of power in 1997. Moreover, the Asian 
financial crisis and generational changes might make economic conditions more 
accessible.  
  
III. Democratization, National Identity, Party System, and Economic Conditions in 
Taiwan 
 
1. Democratization and National Identity 
 Similar to the increasing importance of social cleavages in Korean politics, social 
divisions, in this case caused by national identity, have been more salient since Taiwan 
achieved economic maturity and democratization. In this section, I explore how 
preexisting ethnic cleavages have constrained political competition in Taiwan in ways 
that have mobilized national identity and influenced elite strategies and party systems. 
The ethnic cleavage between Chinese mainlanders—those who came to Taiwan after 
1949—and native Taiwanese—those who immigrated to Taiwan before 1949—has been 
the major division within Taiwanese society due to the disparity of political power 
between these two groups. After being defeated by the Chinese communists in the 
  49 
Chinese civil war between 1945 and 1949, the Kuomintang Party (KMT) led by Chiang 
Kai-shek moved to Taiwan and created a party-state dominated by mainland elites. The 
KMT excluded native Taiwanese elites and employed suppressive policies against 
antigovernment activists (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Tien 
1996a; Chu and Lin 1996). The brutal suppression of the Taiwanese activists was 
illustrated in the February 28, 1947 Incident, which killed thousands of native Taiwanese 
and heightened the division between mainlanders and native Taiwanese (Dickson 1996; 
Tien 1996a; Ho and Liu 2001; Wang and Liu 2004).  
Democratization in Taiwan brought not only a legitimacy crisis for the KMT 
regime but also a crisis of national identity for the people of Taiwan (Chu 2004, 2001; 
Chu and Lin 1996). Democratization in Taiwan was directly related to Taiwan’s nation-
building. During authoritarian rule, the KMT suppressed Taiwanese consciousness and 
imposed the “One China” principle to legitimize its regime, but democratization opened 
up space for the discussion over Taiwanese identity (Chu 2004; Chu and Lin 1996; Wang 
and Liu 2004; Wu 2004). With the democratization of Taiwan, the identity of Taiwanese 
as a political form of ethnic identity was translated into political cleavages, especially 
after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the first opposition party established in 
1986, proclaimed itself as the Taiwanese party and set the goal of self-determination 
(Alagappa 2001; Chu and Lin 1996). While ethnicity indicates a person’s origin, national 
identity in Taiwan is associated with whether individuals identify themselves with 
Taiwanese or Chinese. National identity is not innate but is socially and politically 
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constructed, which means it is subject to manipulation through elite strategies used to win 
political power (Chu 2004; Dittmer 2004, Wu 2004).  
The DPP linked democratic reform to the intertwined issues of national identity, 
Taiwan’s statehood, and the redistribution of power from the mainland elites to native 
Taiwanese (Chu 2001, 2004; Chu and Diamond 1999; Chu and Lin 1996; Lin, Chu, and 
Hinich 1996). The DPP mobilized national identity for similar reasons Korean opposition 
parties exploited regional identity. First, unlike in many Latin American and Eastern 
European countries, democratization in Taiwan was triggered by a top-down pro-
democracy reform initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor Lee Teng-hui (Rigger 
2004a). KMT leaders gradually achieved political liberalization. Therefore, even though 
several important bottom-up movements existed, the opposition party could not use the 
pro- versus anti-democratization cards to mobilize votes. Second, continuous economic 
prosperity through land reform in the 1950s and export-oriented industrialization of the 
1960s decreased the disparity of income distribution, which removed the possibility for 
the opposition party to exploit conflict over the distribution of wealth (Hsiao and Cheng 
1999; Chu and Lin 1996; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). Third, prominent social issues that 
could cut across the broad support of the KMT did not exist. Social welfare expansion, 
the so-called Welfare State platform introduced by the DPP in the early 1990s, was co-
opted by the KMT, which brought in a universal health insurance plan in 1995 and a 
national pension plan in 2000 (Chu and Diamond 1999; Diamond 2001). In short, 
exploiting social divisions by national identity was a strategic choice undertaken by the 
DPP to undermine the KMT’s wide-ranging support across social classes and to unite the 
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opposition forces, or tangwai (Chu and Lin 1996; Dittmer 2004; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 
1996; Schubert 2004).  
 
2. From One-Party Dominance to a Competitive Party System 
 This section examines how conflicts over national identity have changed party 
systems in Taiwan from one-party dominant to competitive and how political elites and 
parties have exploited the issue to take electoral advantages. Although Taiwan was a 
democracy by 2000, the ruling KMT party had never lost control of the presidency or the 
parliament (the Legislative Yuan) at the national level. In other words, the former 
authoritarian party, which retreated to Taiwan after losing the battle with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in the mainland in 1949, had been the only ruling party through 
repeated democratic elections until 2000 (Chu 2001; Chu and Diamond 1999; Diamond 
2001). Organizational and clientelist ties with their key constituencies under authoritarian 
rule made it possible for the KMT to mobilize broad support. The KMT’s ability to co-
opt most democratic reform issues initiated by the opposition party and its indigenization 
(or Taiwanization), as well as persisting economic prosperity, contributed to continuous 
KMT dominance after democratization (Chu 2001; Chu and Diamond 1999; Dickson 
1996; Tien 1996a).  
 However, democratization and the indigenization of the KMT through the power 
transition from a mainland elite to a native Taiwanese leadership did not occur without 
damaging the KMT’s hegemonic status. Taiwan’s transition to democracy launched a 
new era of party competition. The political reforms of the 1980s under Chiang Ching-
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kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, lifted martial law and the ban on political parties, 
allowing an opposition force called Tangwai (anti-KMT elites) to establish the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 (Dickson 1996; Hsieh 1996; Clark 2001; 
Tien 1996a). The DPP opened up the discussion over the issue of Taiwanese identity by 
advocating Taiwanese identity and “One Taiwan.”  
 The indigenization of the KMT and conflicts over Taiwanese identity intertwined 
with the issue of Taiwan’s independence from China also contributed to a more 
competitive party system by creating internal strife within the KMT.7 Particularly, the 
issue of Taiwan’s independence has been the most important factor in party formation 
and realignment in Taiwan after democratization (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Ho and Liu 
2001; Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Schubert 2004). The KMT underwent several intraparty 
splits after Lee Teng-hui, who is a native Taiwanese, succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo in 
1988. Lee Teng-hui’s success in the power struggle and in the further indigenization of 
the party isolated a group of mainlanders within the KMT (Tien 1995, 1996a). The 
disenchanted KMT leaders led by Chao Shao-kang defected to launch the New Party 
(NP) in 1993. The NP mobilized mainlanders who were suspicious of Lee’s commitment 
to the unification with China, as well as younger middle-class voters (Clark 2001; Hsieh 
1996; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996; Tien 1996b, 1995). The formation of the NP signaled 
changes in the party system by undermining the KMT’s dominance and enhancing the 
DPP’s chance to seize power (Cheng and Hsu 1996). The KMT started to lose its 
                                                 
7 See Table AI-3 in Appendix I for changes in party system from 1949 to 2004. 
  53 
dominance in the Legislative Yuan election of 1995, getting 46.1% of the vote share, 
while the NP became a significant third party (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Clark 2001).8  
 After the 2000 presidential election, there was another intraparty split within the 
KMT. James Soong, who was the Governor of Taiwan Province, established the People 
First Party (PFP) after losing the 2000 presidential election to the DPP candidate, Chen 
Shui-bian. Soong opposed Lee’s policies over constitutional reform, and the removal of 
the Governorship of Taiwan province in particular, which the NP perceived as a further 
separation from China (Diamond 2001). Soong ran for the 2000 presidential election as 
an independent candidate after losing the KMT presidential nomination to Lien Chan. 
Another disruption in the party system occurred when Lee Teng-hui formed the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. Lee Teng-hui came back to politics after a brief 
retirement because of his dissatisfaction with the KMT’s policy over Taiwan’s 
independence. After Lien Chan assumed the leadership of the KMT from Lee, he tried to 
distance his policy on independence from Lee’s by emphasizing unification with China 
(Schubert 2004; Wu 2002). That is, newly formed parties, such as the PFP and the TSU 
also joined national identity conflicts. If we place each party on the independence-
unification continuum, the NP has taken the most pro-unification stance, followed by the 
KMT and the DPP (Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Hsieh 1996). The TSU has taken the most 
pro-independence stance.  
 The party system in Taiwan seemed to move toward a multiparty system after 
democratization, but the parties were actually divided into two camps based on their 
                                                 
8 See Table AI-4 in Appendix I for vote shares by party in Legislative Yuan elections from 1992 to 2004. 
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views on Taiwan’s future as part of China. In the 2004 presidential election, electoral 
coalitions among parties showed the possibility of two-party system: the pan-green—a 
coalition of KMT and PFP—and the pan-blue—a coalition of DPP and TSU, advocated 
pro-unification and pro-independence, respectively. In short, enduring social divisions 
over national identity, as well as potential military threats from China, shaped political 
competitions in Taiwan by influencing concerns of voters and political parties.  
 
3. Democratization and Economic Conditions 
 As a one party-state, the KMT played a crucial role in Taiwan’s economic 
development during their authoritarian rule and even after democratization. Like Korea, 
Taiwan, as one of Asia’s “Four Tigers,” followed a strategy of growth and export-
oriented industrialization, which achieved fast and constant economic growth recognized 
as a “miracle” by the world (Hsiao and Cheng 1999). KMT’s industrialization of Taiwan 
can be divided into four stages: (1) a focus in the 1950s on economic rehabilitation 
through the import substitution increasing agricultural and industrial production; (2) an 
emphasis during the 1960s on export-oriented industrialization by developing labor-
intensive industries; (3) a continued emphasis during the 1970s on export-oriented 
industries but an increased attention to electrical machinery and the computer industry; 
and (4) a focus during the 1980s to 1990s on economic liberalization and globalization 
(Hsiao and Cheng 1999; Maguire 1998). Through state-led economic policies, Taiwan 
experienced rapid and unprecedented economic growth, recording average growth rate of 
9.03 from 1952 to 1979. The economic growth rate slowed down from 10.31 in the 1970s 
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to 8.17 in the 1980s and to 6.51 in the 1990s.9 However, even the low growth rates were 
quite high for a country achieving industrial maturity since the tendency to slow down 
and stabilize is not unusual for advanced economies (Chen 2001; Diamond 2001). 
Furthermore, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 did not have much impact on Taiwan’s 
economy in comparison with neighboring countries such as Korea (Cheng and Liao 1998; 
Diamond 2001). 
 With the first handover of power in the executive branch in 2000, however, 
Taiwan’s economic fortunes declined rapidly. After the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian 
won the 2000 presidential election to become the first president from an opposition party, 
Taiwan experienced unprecedented negative economic growth of -2.18 in 2001. Chen 
Shui-bian not only had little experience in handling the economy but also a poor 
understanding of the Taiwanese economy (Chu 2001; Wu 2001). While the KMT’s 
economic policies had focused on the high-tech industry, which had been the cornerstone 
of Taiwan’s economic growth since the 1970s, the new government turned its attention 
and support to the agricultural industry (Chu 2001). Economic conditions did not 
improve in 2002 and 2003. Taiwan’s stock market plummeted, unemployment soared, 
and exports dropped precipitously (Rigger 2003, 2004; Wu 2001, 2002).   
 As was the case in Korea, a pre-existing social cleavage has prevailed Taiwanese 
politics. The political and economic differences between native Taiwanese and 
mainlanders were transposed to conflicts over national identity, which operated as a 
perceptual screen imposing a constraint on other attitudes. More importantly, parties have 
                                                 
9 See Figure AII-2 in Appendix II for the annual economic growth rate in Taiwan from 1951-2006. 
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formed on the basis of their positions on national identity, either “One China” or “One 
Taiwan,” making the national identity issue accessible and distinctive. The one-party 
dominant system until 2000 also made parties less distinctive in terms of economic 
performance, since opposition parties did not have any record to show their ability to 
handle the economy. That is, economic conditions could better differentiate parties after 
the 2000 presidential election, when the opposition party candidate became the president 
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Information-processing models suggest that attitudes must be available and 
accessible in order to influence individual behavior. Under these models, the accessibility 
of attitudes is the key mediating factor determining the connection between attitudes and 
behavior. The more accessible an attitude is the more likely it is to affect individual vote 
choice among available attitudes. I emphasize, however, that candidates must be 
distinctive in terms of an issue for an attitude about the issue to bear on individual vote 
choice. Furthermore, previous information-processing approaches have focused on 
differences between individual voters and campaigns as sources of attitude availability 
and accessibility. In this chapter, I pay attention to the existence of ethno-cultural 
cleavages, regional identity in particular, in Korea. I argue that when social conflicts over 
personal or social identity dominate politics, individual political attitudes are shaped by 
emotional attachment to identity rather than personal/national material interest. 
Accounting for the distinctiveness of candidates and social cleavages, this chapter 
provides a better understanding of how Korean voters make their political decisions and 
when economic conditions and regional identity become important in specific elections. 
This chapter addresses two main questions through an examination of three Korean 
presidential elections (1992, 1997, and 2002): How are economic voting and regional 
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identity-based voting relevant to individual vote choice in Korea? And, under what 
conditions do economic evaluations or identity issues matter more?  
Before answering these questions, I first discuss the availability, accessibility, and 
distinctiveness of economic conditions and regional identity in Korea. Second, I provide 
research design, introducing variables and models specific to the Korean case. Third, 
using multinomial and binary probit regressions, I analyze the effect of economic 
evaluations and regional identity on Korean voters’ preferences over candidates. Finally, 
I discuss the implications of how economic conditions and regional identity might affect 
future Korean elections as political and economic circumstances change.  
 
II. Economic Conditions and Regional Identity: Evidence of the Availability, 
Accessibility, and Distinctiveness in Korean Elections 
 
1. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Economic Conditions 
 For economic conditions to play a key role in individual electoral decisions, they 
have to be both highly available and accessible. Furthermore, candidates must show clear 
differences in their ability to handle the economy. An attitude, as an object-evaluation 
association, is available when voters have an opinion about an issue and are aware of its 
political relevance (Campbell et al. 1960; Fazio et al. 1984). Therefore, the availability of 
economic conditions can be measured through the attribution of responsibility for 
economic conditions. The attribution of responsibility indicates whether voters form an 
opinion about economic conditions and then relate their evaluations to politics by 
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attributing credit or blame to incumbent parties or politicians. Unless voters attribute 
responsibility to the government for economic success or failure, voters cannot evaluate 
candidates in terms of economic conditions (Feldman 1982, 1985; Hibbing and Alford 
1981; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Weatherford 1978).  
 A 1992 post-election survey in Korea asked the respondents: “Do you agree with 
the statement that the government cannot solve the poverty problem whatsoever?” A 
similar survey conducted after the 1997 election asked: “Which party do you think is 
responsible for the economic crisis of 1997?” Table 4-1 below indicates that more than 
half of the respondents in 1992 and 1997 thought that the government or political parties 
had a responsibility for poverty or economic crises. In 1992, 52 percent of the 
respondents answered that the government could solve or control poverty problems. 
Similarly, 58 percent of the respondents in 1997 attributed economic failure to one of the 
political parties in the legislature. These results imply that attitudes about economic 
conditions were available to many Korean voters.  
 
Table 4-1. Attribution of Responsibility for Poverty and Economic Crisis in 1992 and 
1997 (%) 
 
Poverty (1992) Economic Crisis (1997) 
Government responsibility 




Blame one of parties 




N 1187 N 1195 
Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 14th Presidential Election Study, 1993 and 
the 15th Presidential Election Study, 1997. 
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A high accessibility of attitudes toward economic conditions is another necessary 
condition for economic evaluations to affect individual electoral preferences. 
Accessibility refers to the readiness with which a stored attitude is utilized for political 
decisions (Higgins and King 1981). The accessibility of an attitude is subject to the 
frequency of activation, links to other attitudes, and subjective importance to individual 
voters (Aldrich et al. 1989; Fazio 1989; Higgins and King 1981; Krosnick 1988, 1989). 
To analyze the accessibility of economic conditions, I examine the responses to the 
question of the most important issue that the country faces, because the more important 
an attitude the more often it will be activated and linked to other attitudes (Krosnick 
1989). 
 
Table 4-2. The Most Important Issue that Korea Faces, 1992, 1997, and 2002 (%) 
 






Political and Regional Integration 
Corruption 
Regime Change 
































N 1191 1188 1486 
Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 14th Presidential Election Study of 1992 
and the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997. The Korean Social Science Data Center, the 16th 
Presidential Election Study of 2002. 
 
  61 
Table 4-2 shows that more than 46 percent of the respondents in a post-election 
survey of each presidential election thought that an economic issue, including inflation, 
economic growth, or employment, was the most important problem the country faced. 
Particularly, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 made economic issues more accessible. 
More than 80 percent of the respondent listed one of the economic issues as the most 
significant problem in 1997, including 26 percent of the respondents who answered that 
overcoming economic crisis was the most important problem. The results of the 2002 
survey also indicate that people tended to be more concerned about the employment issue 
due to a decrease in job security after the economic crisis. While the importance of 
economic issues has been increasing, fewer and fewer people have reported one of the 
other issues, such as political and regional integration, corruption, or national security, as 
the most important problem. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 both suggest that attitudes toward 
economic conditions were not only available but also highly accessible to most Korean 
voters.  
The distinctiveness of candidates and parties in terms of economic performance is 
the final and key factor in determining whether economic conditions will influence 
individual vote choice. In other words, economic issues must be translated into electoral 
competitions for personal and national economic evaluations to influence electoral 
choices. Thus, candidates or parties must not only discuss economic issues but also 
present different positions on these issues. Unlike other issues, however, economic 
performance issues require relatively little comparison between the ruling party and the 
opposition parties. Depending on their evaluations on personal and/or national economic 
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conditions during an administration, voters either reward or punish the ruling party 
(Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck 1983, 1988). Strong economic 
voting, however, can exist only when opposition parties have been in power. Even though 
one-party dominance makes it easy for voters to attribute responsibility for economic 
conditions, as Magaloni (1999) argues, it also provides uncertainty or asymmetric 
information on long-time opposition parties. Due to the uncertainty of an alternative 
party’s ability to handle economic problems, voters may not punish the governing party 
unless the cost of sustaining the status quo outweighs the payoff from changes. In other 
words, voters cannot distinguish parties on the basis of economic performance under a 
one-party dominant system and thus cannot easily vote against the incumbent for short-
term economic downturns. 
  Korea experienced a one-party dominant system until 1997, witnessing no 
alternation of power between parties. Occurring in the middle of an economic crisis, the 
1997 presidential election produced the first opposition party president. Therefore, 
Korean voters in the presidential election in 2002 had information they did not have in 
1992 and 1997 about both parties’ ability to handle the economy and could distinguish 
the parties on the basis of their economic performance. The distinctiveness of economic 
conditions has varied across elections. I expect to find no evidence of economic voting in 
1992 and 1997, while I expect to see evidence of economic voting in 2002, when Korean 
voters were experienced both parties in power and had more information about the 
previous opposition party. 
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2. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Regional Identity 
 The availability of regional identity is measured by whether voters are aware of 
group differences based on region. In other words, regional identity is available when 
voters have formed a group consciousness, which is a politicized awareness of a group’s 
relative position in society. Group consciousness affects the individual’s reaction to in-
groups and out-groups (Conover 1988). Through an affective calculus of likes and 
dislikes toward groups, people attribute attitudes to groups and emphasize the difference 
between their own groups and other groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Conover 1988; 
Iyengar and McGwire 1993). Therefore, I measure the attitude availability of regional 
identity using a study of the likeability of people from different regions and individual 
experiences of discrimination as a member of particular region—Cholla, Kyongsang, or 
Other.  
 Figure 4-1 shows that people from the Cholla region were considered least 
likeable by people from other regions. The likeability of people from North Korea was 
even higher than the likeability of those from Cholla. The likeability difference between 
Cholla and each of other regions, including Kyongsang, is statistically significant. In 
addition, the 1997 and the 2000 post-election surveys asked whether the respondents 
experienced unequal treatment in job promotion and employment, monetary loss, 
humiliation, and isolation because of their home region. Citizens of Cholla reported being 
more likely to experience discrimination and isolation, as Table 4-3 indicates. Few people 
reported they had been unequally treated simply because of their home region. However, 
the mean differences between Cholla and other regions, as well as between Cholla and 
  64 
Kyongsang, are statistically significant in both years, while the difference between 
Kyongsang and other regions is not statistically significant. These data show that people 
were aware of regional differences, especially between Cholla and the rest. 
 
















Capital Area Kangwon Chungchong Kyongsang Cheju North Korea Cholla
Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997. 
  
Table 4-3. Individual Experiences of Discrimination as a Particular Regional Member in 
 1997 and 2000 (1 to 5)  
 
Region Mean (Std.) in 1997 Mean (Std.) in 2000 
Cholla .933 (1.339) .467 (1.050) 
Kyongsang .205 (.706) .152 (.586) 
Other Regions .257 (.707) .157 (.585) 
N 1165 1100 
Source: The Institute for Korean Election Studies, the 15th Presidential Election Study of 1997 
and the Korean Social Science Data Center, the 16th Legislative Election Study of 2000. 
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The second necessary condition for regional identity to affect individual vote 
choice is accessibility. The more important regional identity issue is to voters, the more 
accessible the issue becomes. However, less than 3 percent of the respondents in both 
surveys of 1997 and 2002 admitted to having considered candidates’ home regions when 
they decided their vote. Table 4-2 also shows that few people (16% in 1992, 2.2% in 
1997, and 6.3% in 2002) reported that political and regional integration associated with 
regional identity was the most important problem that Korea faced between 1992 and 
2002. Does this therefore mean that attitudes about regional identity are not accessible? 
Not necessarily. If we examine the history of election outcomes in Korea, it is clear that 
regions have been one of the most important determinants in all presidential elections 
from 1987 to 2002.10 Candidates from the parties based on the Cholla region gained 
absolute support from Cholla voters. More than 80 percent of Cholla voters voted for 
their regional party candidates. More than 60 percent of Kyongsang voters, meanwhile, 
cast their ballots for their regional party candidates. 
The subjective importance of regional identity to voters is not the only measure of 
its accessibility. We can also examine how closely regional identity is linked to other 
attitudes. When regional identity is associated with many other attitudes, it is more 
frequently activated and thus more accessible. Table 4-4 indicates that regional identity 
for voters from Cholla and voters from Kyongsang, in particular, were meaningfully 
correlated with attitudes toward party identification, likeability of candidates, and issue 
positions. Candidates, parties, and issues tend to be intertwined, since assessments of 
                                                 
10 See Table AI-1 in Appendix I for presidential candidates’ vote shares by region from 1987 to 2002. 
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candidates are usually influenced by the more enduring forces of parties and issues 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malenchuk 1986). This seems to be more 
so in Korea than in other countries even though candidates have been more stable than 
parties or issues in Korea. Since democratization in 1987, regional political leaders have 
established their own parties based on their home regions. During election campaigns 
charismatic political leaders and parties have activated and reinforced regional identity.  
 
Table 4-4. Pairwise Correlations between Regional Identity and Other Attitudes in 1992, 
1997, and 2002 
 
Cholla Kyongsang  
1992 1997 2002 1992 1997 2002 
Ruling-party orientation
1





.39** .41** -.16** -.27** -.30** .12** 
Likeability of ruling party 
candidate 
-.45** -.32** N/A .29** .25** N/A 
Likeability of opposition 
party candidate 1 
.54** .58** N/A -.34** -.36** N/A 
Likeability of opposition 
party candidate 2 
-.05 -.20** N/A -.09** .11** N/A 
Issues
2
 -.24** .29** .18** .15** -.22** -.13** 
Note: 1. Korean voters have been more likely to associate themselves with either the ruling 
parties or the opposition parties because of frequent changes in party names and coalitions.  
2. Issues include the grand party merger of 1992, economic crisis of 1997, and unconditional aid 
to North Korea. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
  
 Finally, the distinctiveness of regional identity is clear in that parties were formed 
by regional leaders who mobilized regional support. The main parties have been based in 
the two rival regions of Cholla and Kyongsang. Regional identity is more distinctive 
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when candidates’ home regions and parties’ regional bases overlap, providing easier and 
stronger connections between the candidates and their regions. Table 4-5 shows whether 
a candidate’s home region and the party’s regional-base are the same in recent Korean 
elections. Two regional leaders, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, ran for the 
presidency in 1992, representing their own regional parties, while only one regional 
leader, Kim Dae-jung, campaigned for election in 1997. None of regional favorite sons 
was on the ballot in the 2002 presidential election. These facts imply that regional 
identity provided more distinctiveness between the candidates in the 1992 and the 1997 
elections than in the 2002 election. 
 
Table 4-5. Presidential Candidates’ Home Regions and Parties’ Regional Bases in 1992, 
1997, and 2002 
 
Year Candidate Home Regions Party’s Regional Base 
Kim Young-sam Kyongsang Kyongsang 
Kim Dae-jung Cholla Cholla 
1992 
Chung Ju-yung Kwangwon No regional base 
Lee Hoe-chang Hwanghae Kyongsang 
Kim Dae-jung Cholla Cholla 
1997 
Rhee In-je Chungcheong No regional base 
Roh Moo-hyun Kyongsang Cholla 2002 
Lee Hoe-chang Hwanghae Kyongsang 
Note: Bold indicates a match between the candidate’s home region and the party’s regional base.  
 
In short, attitudes about regional identity have been available, accessible, and distinctive 
across recent elections even though the candidates were less distinctive in terms of 
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regional identity in 2002 than in 1992 and 1997. The presence of charismatic regional 
leaders makes regional identity more accessible and distinctive. Therefore, I expect 
stronger regional voting in 1992 and 1997 than in 2002, as expressed in the following: 
 Year Economic Voting Regional Identity Voting 
1992 No  Yes 
1997 No  Yes 
2002 Yes Yes but weak  
 
The remainder of this chapter examines whether economic conditions and 
regional identity influenced Korean voters’ preferences through empirical analyses of 
Korean presidential elections. I begin with introducing the data, dependent and 
independent variables, models, and estimations. Second, I present either multinomial or 
binary probit regression results on the effects of both economic conditions and regional 
identity for each election. Finally, I discuss the significance and implications of economic 
and regional-identity voting for future elections in Korea. 
 
III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models 
The presidential elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002 provide the cases to analyze 
the effects of economic evaluations and regional identity on electoral preferences in 
Korea. The datasets are available in the Korean Social Science Data Center (KSDC).11 
For the vote choice models, the dependent variables are individual vote choices. 
Controlling variables and their measurements are discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                 
11 http://www.ksdc.re.kr 
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1. Independent Variables and Measurements:  
 The variables considered in my models are sociotropic and pocketbook 
evaluations, lifetime economic experience, regional identity, party identification, 
candidate likeability, and particular issue positions. In addition to economic evaluations, I 
have also included any political or economic scandals in order to capture the unique 
characteristics of each election, as well as demographic factors. The variables of major 
interest are retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations by individual voters. 
Sociotropic evaluation refers to the individual perception of the national economic 
conditions, while pocketbook evaluation denotes individual perception of personal 
economic situations. Sociotropic evaluation is measured by how individuals evaluate 
changes in the national economy over the previous two years, while pocketbook 
evaluation is measured by how individuals perceive the changes in their personal or 
family financial situations over the previous two years. These two evaluations are 
measured on five-point scales, with 1 indicating “better-off” and 5 indicating “worse-off” 
than two years prior. Respondents who viewed national and/or personal economic 
conditions as being worse are expected to be more likely to vote for a challenger. 
Lifetime economic experience is another economic variable to be considered. 
Along with short-term economic evaluations, life-time economic experiences shape 
voters’ electoral preferences, especially in one-party dominant countries (Aldrich and 
Magaloni 2006; Magaloni 1999). The Korean party system had been one-party dominant 
until the election of 1997, when Korean voters first experienced an opposition party’s 
coming to power. Due to this circumstance, opposition parties did not have any record of 
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accomplishment to show their ability to govern or handle the economy, which caused 
voters to be uncertain about their potential performance (Aldrich and Magaloni 2006; 
Magaloni 1999). People who had experienced good economic fortune with the dominant 
party in power, moreover, were not likely to vote for opposition parties, even when the 
economy had been poor recently. Unless they had confidence in an opposition party and 
experienced an economy poor enough to offset previous positive economic experiences, 
they would continue to vote for the incumbent party. Therefore, the better economy a 
respondent experienced while the dominant party was in power, the less likely he or she 
would be to vote for a challenger in spite of recent poor economic performance. To 
measure long-term economic experiences with the dominant party, I use the GDP growth 
from 1954 onward, published online by the Bank of Korea.12 Following the formula used 
by Aldrich and Magaloni (2006), I compute the average economic growth experienced by 
each individual from age 10, year by year, weighting these economic experiences so that 
early years, when individual attitudes about politics develop, are more heavily 
weighted.13 I assume that respondents who were born before 1944 have the same lifetime 
economic experience.  
Regional identity is another major variable of interest that helps explain 
individual vote choice in Korea. Most societies have social cleavages that divide 
members into different groups and organizations among which potential conflict exists 
(Choe 2003). Some, but not all, social cleavages are exploited by political parties, which 
                                                 
12 www.ecos.bok.or.kr (accessed September 10, 2006). 








, where t=1 is GDP growth at age 10. 
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translate cleavages into political competition and bring about actual conflict between 
different groups within the society. Political elites most often decide which cleavages 
become political (Andersen and Heath 2003; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Under 
circumstances in which few secondary organizations exist, political elites can play a 
major role in defining the issue of party support (Chhibber and Torcal 1997). Korean 
political elites mobilized regional conflicts, in particular between Cholla and Kyongsang, 
after democratization. For the purpose of my research, therefore, I categorize respondents 
into three groups: those from Kyongsang, those from Cholla, and those from all other 
regions.  
 Party identification (PID) in Korea is slightly different from PID in the United 
States. PID in Korea is a psychological attachment to either the government party or 
opposition parties, but not an attachment to any specific party.14 Due to the volatility of 
political parties, Korean voters do not develop stable party identification.15 What has 
been persistent is the division between government-party and opposition-party 
orientations. Until the regime change of 1997, the government-party orientation was 
dominated by issues emphasizing stability, economic growth, and national security, while 
the opposition-party orientation endeavored to improve democracy, human rights, and 
social justice (Choe 2003; Kang, W. 1998). To analyze Korean elections, therefore, I 
substitute government-party and opposition-party orientation for party identification. 
They are coded as three different dummy variables: government-party orientation, 
                                                 
14 Jung-bin Cho (1993) argues that government-party and opposition-party orientation is closer to belief 
system or ideological orientation than to party identification. 
15 See Table AI-2 in Appendix I for Korean party changes. 
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opposition-party orientation, and neither. Respondents who identify with one of the three 
variables are marked as 1, otherwise they are marked as 0.  
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, personalization is one characteristic of Korean 
politics. In other words, the likeability of individual candidates plays an important role in 
Korean elections (Choi and Lee 1980; Cho 1996; Lee and Lee 2002). The importance of 
candidate likeability results from the volatile party system and the role of political leaders 
in the changing party system. Voters have faced different parties in almost every 
presidential election, but they have known which party belonged to which leader. That is, 
it is much easier for Korean voters to recognize candidates than political parties. 
Candidate likeability is measured by the differences between the incumbent party’s 
candidate likeability and each opposition party’s candidate likeability in 1992. Since it is 
impossible to calculate likeability differences between candidates from the 1997 survey 
data, I use dummy variables to measure candidate likeability: 1 for respondents who liked 
a certain candidate most and 0 otherwise. 
 While political parties and candidates in Korea have not usually advocated policy 
alternatives, some issues have provoked strong emotions and intense debates. One of the 
main issues has been Korean reunification and the relationship with North Korea, which 
has had an impact on Korean politics since the 1950s. The issue was particularly 
important during election periods when the government party took advantage of threats 
from North Korea, the so-called “northern wind involving guns,”16 to mobilize anti-
                                                 
16 North Korea threatened to attack South Korea by bringing about small gun fights at the time of elections. 
The authoritarian regimes and ruling parties used to take advantage of threats from North Korea for their 
elections, persuading voters to rally around the flag.   
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communist fears (Park 1999, p.139). I placed respondents’ positions on unification into 
three categories: unification by taking over North Korea, unification on the initiative of 
South Korea, and unification on an equal footing. Each category is coded as a dummy 
variable. Unfortunately, the 1997 and the 2002 data did not ask respondents about their 
positions on unification. I replace respondents’ unification issue positions with their 
ideological orientations as a proxy in 1997 and 2002. 
 In my analysis, I also consider political scandals or other important events in 
order to capture idiosyncratic and short-term forces in each election. The 1992 
presidential election was held just after the three-party merger of 1990, which was a 
coalition between Roh Tae-woo’s ruling Democratic Justice Party and two opposition 
parties—Kim Young-sam’s Reunification Democratic Party and Kim Jong-pil’s New 
Democratic Republican Party. These parties formed a massive majority ruling party, the 
Democratic Liberal Party. The merger evoked criticism from the public, especially 
citizens in Cholla, due to the exclusion of Kim Dae-jung’s Cholla-based Party for Peace 
and Democracy. As a result, the merger further divided the country into Cholla versus 
other regions. Each respondent’s opinion about the three-party merger is measured by a 
five-point scale from strongly disapprove to strongly approve. For the 1997 election, I 
account for the Asian financial crisis, one of the top issues of the time. More than 26 
percent of respondents picked overcoming the economic crisis as the most important 
problem the nation faced. Economic crisis is coded 1 for respondents who blamed the 
incumbent party for the crisis and 0 otherwise. Unlike previous elections, there were 
several important political events related to national security issues during the 2002 
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election. One was the death of two middle-school girls, killed in December 2002 by 
American soldiers stationed in Korea during their military training. This incident aroused 
anti-American feeling and renewed the demand for reform of the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) and a pullout of American troops from South Korea. Each 
respondent’s opinion about SOFA reform is measured by a five-point scale from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. In addition, I include respondents’ opinion about two other 
issues—aid to North Korea and abolishment of national security laws—that were hotly 
debated during the election. These are measured by using the same method as the opinion 
about the SOFA reform.  
 The final variable group captures demographic characteristics of respondents, 
specifically age, level of education, and family income. Age is measured by a 
respondent’s actual age. Level of education is categorized into four groups: elementary 
school or less, middle school completed, high school completed, and college or more. 




In many situations the dependent variable in a regression equation is not 
continuous but a discrete choice, such as vote choice in elections. Models involving 
dependent variables of this kind are called “discrete choice models” or “categorical 
models.” These models are typically based on the principle of utility maximization 
leading to the choice of A over B if the utility A exceeds that of B. When the dependent 
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variable involves binary or dichotomous choices, one of the two nonlinear models—logit 
and probit—are commonly used. The multinomial logit (MNL) or probit (MNP) models 
are used for more than two unordered nominal dependent variables. 
I use the MNP model to analyze the 1992 and 1997 presidential election, which 
had more than two candidates, while I use the probit model for the 2002 presidential 
election, which had only two candidates. The logit and probit models are quite similar, 
apart from the difference between the logistic distribution and the normal distribution, 
which means that the logit and probit estimates are similar. The MNP and MNL models, 
however, substantially differ in one important assumption. The MNL model assumes 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA), that the probability to choose one candidate 
over the other does not change because of a third-party candidate. In other words, the 
MNL model compares two candidates at a time, as the binomial logit model does, even 
though a third candidate exists (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). This seems to be an 
unreasonable assumption in elections involving multiple candidates. On the contrary, the 
MNP model allows for both individual-specific and alternative-specific variables and 
does not impose the IIA assumption, by admitting the possibility of non-independence 
among the choice dimensions (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). As a result, the MNP estimates 
provide more consistent and efficient estimates than the MNL estimates for elections with 
more than two candidates.  
Like other discrete choice models, both the MNP and probit models assume that 
the probability of selecting a given choice is the probability that the utility for this choice 
exceeds the utility of all other alternatives. The coefficients for the incumbent party 
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candidate are normalized to zero. Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates a higher 
probability of voting for the incumbent party candidate in each column, while a positive 
sign indicates a higher probability of choosing the opposition party candidate.  
 
IV. Empirical Analyses 
 
1. The 1992 Presidential Election 
 The 1992 Korean presidential election was mainly a competition between Kim 
Young-sam (hereinafter KYS) and Kim Dae-jung (hereinafter KDJ), who were former 
allies in the fight for democratization in Korea. KYS joined the three-party merger of 
1990, which was called an “unholy alliance” since he compromised his political identity 
as a “pro-democracy fighter” for his electoral goal of the presidency (Oh 1999; Park 
1990). KYS was then nominated as the ruling party candidate, while KDJ remained as the 
candidate of the main opposition party (the Party for Peace and Democracy, PPD). 
Businessman Chung Ju-yung (hereinafter CJY), the owner and founder of Hyundai, 
Korea’s largest conglomerate, or chaebol, challenged the “two Kims” on the grounds of 
his success in business and his relationship with North Korea in the private sector. KYS 
won the election by receiving 42 percent of the popular vote.17 He gathered most of his 
votes from his hometown province, Kyongsang, and from Kim Jong-pil’s (hereinafter 
KJP) stronghold, Chungchong, as a result of the three-party merger. 
                                                 
17 See Table AI-5 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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Table 4-6 presents the multinomial probit regression results of the 1992 Korean 
presidential election. Sociotropic evaluation, one of the primary interest variables, is 
statistically significant only in the equation of KDJ and KYS. Unlike the findings of 
much economic voting literature, however, the sign of sociotropic evaluation is negative. 
That is, voters who perceived that the national economy had worsened were more likely 
to vote for the incumbent than for the challenger. The direction of the sociotropic 
evaluation might be explained by the uncertainty of the opposition party or the ruling 
party’s economic issue ownership. Under the dominant ruling party, Korean voters had 
never experienced a serious economic decline, which gave the ruling party a strong case 
for economic success. Since the first military president, Park Chung-hee, took over the 
government in 1961, the economy achieved consistent growth. The Korean economy 
recorded 5.95 percent average annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita between 1962 and 1982 (Bank of Korea 1995). When the second and the third 
soldiers-turned-presidents, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, took control of the 
government between 1981 and 1992, the economy kept thriving, marking 8 percent 
growth rate of GDP per capita. Thus, voters might have had both little desire for change 
and also a belief that the ruling party would be better at handling the economy than the 
opposition parties, which had no experience in governing. The coefficient of pocketbook 
evaluation in the competition between KDJ and KYS shows the expected direction but is 
not statistically significant. Neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluation affected 
individual vote choice between CJY and KYS. 
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Table 4-6. MNP Estimates for the 1992 Election 
 
Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ 
Kim Young-sam (KYS) 
Chung Ju-yung (CJY)/ 
Kim Young-sam (KYS) 
Variables 




Lifetime economic experience 
Regional Identity  
Region 1(Cholla) 




Likeability difference 1(a) 
Likeability difference 2 (b) 
Unification by South Korea 











































































Log Likelihood -276.782 
N 938 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Kim Young-sam are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects 
(∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables 
and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (a) Likeability difference between 
KYS and KDJ. 4. (b) Likeability difference between KYS and CJY. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
The lifetime economic experience with the dominant ruling party did not seem to 
matter much in explaining individual vote choice between KDJ and KYS, as well as 
between CJY and KYS, in 1992. The positive sign of the coefficient in the equation of 
KYS and KDJ indicates that the better the economic experience a voter had with the 
dominant party, the more likely he or she was to vote for the challenger, KDJ. In other 
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words, continuous economic prosperity did not seem to guarantee the status quo. When 
we look at the effects of economic variables, Korean voters did not look like typical 
economic voters in this election.  
Voters from Cholla had a greater probability to vote for KDJ than KYS in the 
equation of KYS/KDJ, while Kyongsang voters were more likely to vote for KYS than 
for KDJ. Being from Cholla or Kyongsang, however, did not affect the choice between 
CJY and KYS. These different results between the two equations support the 
distinctiveness hypothesis. The two candidates, KDJ and KYS, clearly represented 
regions, the Kyongsang and Cholla regions, respectively, while CJY did not represent 
any specific region. In other words, voters from both Cholla and Kyongsang saw clear 
differences between KDJ and KYS in terms of their origins, while voters from both 
regions did not see regional difference between CJY and KYS. The larger effect of 
Cholla than of Kyongsang in the choice between KDJ and KYS is also noteworthy (see 
the marginal effects: .333 vs. -.125). It may result from the feelings of frustration or 
isolation of voters from Cholla who were left out of the coalition of the three parties (the 
variable called Three Party Merger). The alliance strengthened the perception people 
from Cholla have had for over 30 years that Kyongsang’s political and military elites 
tried to perpetuate their political power by eliminating all possibility of Cholla’s citizens 
gaining power (Choi 1999; Lee C. 1981). As a result, Cholla citizens united to support 
their political leader, Kim Dae-jung. On the other hand, voters from Kyongsang had a 
smaller stake than Cholla voters because they had been beneficiaries of Kyongsang 
regimes and would get more benefit from the coalition party. Opinions about the three-
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party-merger had an independent effect apart from the regions but were also associated 
with respondents’ origins. Respondents from Kyongsang were most likely to support the 
merger, while respondents from Cholla voters were least likely to support it.18  
Another interesting finding is that opposition-party oriented voters were more 
likely to vote for the candidates from the opposition parties than voters who did not have 
party orientation, whereas ruling-party-oriented voters did not vote based on their party 
orientation. This might be due to the ambiguity of KYS’s position in the ruling party, 
since he had been a long-time opposition party leader and had only joined the ruling party 
in 1990. Even though KYS joined the grand conservative coalition, he was quite different 
from his allies, Roh Tae-woo and Kim Jong-pil, who had served the authoritarian regime 
under President Park, the first soldier-turned president. KYS was still perceived as one of 
the opposition leaders who led Korean democratization. In other words, KYS might not 
have been a clear choice for ruling-party-oriented voters. This could explain some of the 
anomaly seen in the effect of sociotropic evaluation. Voters did not have a clear target to 
blame for the bad economy since there was no clear incumbent candidate but opposition-
minded KYS backed by the experienced ruling party might have been attractive to voters.  
Finally, in both equations, the larger likeability differences between the 
incumbent candidate and the challengers decreased the predicted probability of voting for 
the challengers. In other words, the more voters liked KYS, the more likely they were to 
vote for him. The large marginal effects of the likeability differences seem to show that 
Korean voters considered the character or personality of the candidates as one of the 
                                                 
18 See Table AI-6 in Appendix I for the difference of means test on regional differences in the opinion 
about the three-party merger of 1992. 
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important factors. A voter’s issue position on the country’s reunification with North 
Korea did not influence individual vote choice since the candidates’ positions on this 
issue were very similar, promoting peaceful reunification on the initiative of the South 
Korean government. None of demographic variables is statistically significant.  
To summarize, no ordinary economic voting was evident in the 1992 Korean 
presidential election. Against the expectation of punishing the incumbent party candidate 
for poor economic performance, Korean voters who perceived the national economy as 
worse were more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate. In addition, regions, 
opposition party orientation, and candidate evaluations (or likeability differences) were 
significant factors in determining voters’ electoral choices in both equations. These 
variables not only independently influenced individual electoral decisions but also had a 
reinforcing impact upon each other (see Table 4-4). Voters from Cholla tended to be 
opposition oriented and to like KDJ more than voters in the other regions, while voters 
from Kyongsang were more likely to be ruling-party oriented and to like KYS more than 
voters in other regions.19 That is, regional identity in Korea may have affected individual 
vote choice not only directly but also indirectly, shaping individual attitudes toward 
issues (e.g., the three party merger), candidates, and parties. Closely linked to other 
attitudes, regional identity has been chronically accessible. As a result, in the competition 
between the regional candidates, voters considered region because region differentiated 
the candidates. Regionalism was significant enough to outweigh economic evaluations. In 
the competition between a regional candidate and non-regional candidate, voters took 
                                                 
19 See Table AI-7 in Appendix I for the difference of means test on regional differences in PID. 
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into account factors that distinguish the alternatives. That was usually the candidate’s 
likeability, since there was no issue in 1992 that differentiated the candidates 
significantly. In short, voters depended on accessible issues that provided clear 
alternatives. 
  
2. The 1997 Presidential Election 
The 1997 presidential election was held amid an economic crisis that hit several 
Southeast Asian countries. The administration of President Kim Young-sam had to seek 
an emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to avoid the collapse of 
the economy and to overcome difficulties in the financial and currency markets. The 
Korean economy had not experienced severe economic trauma in more than 30 years.  
Lee Hoe-chang, who was a former judge and prime minister, succeeded President 
Kim Young-sam in the ruling party and changed the party’s name to the New Korean 
Party (NKP) as a way to detach himself from the infamous economic failure of Kim’s 
administration. The NKP held the first primary election to nominate its presidential 
candidate and Lee Hoe-chang (hereinafter LHC) won the nomination. One of the primary 
candidates, Rhee In-je (hereinafter RIJ) defied the decision, however, and ran for the 
presidency through a new party, the New Politics Reform Party (NPRP). On the other 
hand, the opposition parties—Kim Dae-jung’s Democratic Party (DP) and Kim Jong-pil’s 
Unification National Party (UNP)—established a coalition just before the election and 
agreed to nominate Kim Dae-jung as their presidential candidate. Unlike the 1992 
presidential election, the 1997 election was characterized as a break-up of the ruling party 
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and a marriage between the two opposition parties (Lee, G. 1998). The election was 
critical in that it turned the ruling party out of power in a free and fair election for the first 
time since Korea was democratized. Kim Dae-jung (KDJ) finally captured the 
presidency, defeating the ruling party candidate, LHC, by 1.6%.20   
 
 
Table 4-7. MNP Estimates for the 1997 Election 
 
Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ 
Lee Hoe-chang (LHC) 
Rhee In-je (RIJ) 
/Lee Hoe-chang (KHC) 
Variables 




Lifetime economic experience 
Regional Identity 
Region 1 (Cholla) 




Likeability of LHC  
Likeability of KDJ  

















































































Log Likelihood -441.669 
N 930 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lee Hoe-chang are normalized at zero. 2. 
Marginal effects (∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the 
independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (c) is a 
dummy for likeability of Lee Hoe-chang. 4. (d) is a dummy for likeability of Kim Dae-jung. 5. (e) 
is a dummy for likeability of Rhee In-je.    
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
                                                 
20 See Table AI-8 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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Respondents’ economic perceptions of both the national and their personal 
economy had no significant effect on individual vote choice in this election. Even long-
term economic experience did not influence individual electoral preferences. Voters who 
attributed responsibility for the economic crisis to the incumbent party, however, were 
more likely to vote for the challengers (see the variable, blame for economic crisis, in 
Table 4-7). Voters punished the incumbent party for the severe economic failure. As 
there had been only one ruling party until the 1997 election, it seemed to be clear who 
was responsible for the economic fiasco. That is, respondents did not respond to their 
perceptions of short- or long-term economic conditions but considered the unprecedented 
economic catastrophe for their electoral decisions. One thing to note is that even though 
Korean voters were under a so-called crisis, other variables, such as regional identity and 
the likeability of candidates, played larger roles in determining individual vote choice in 
1997 (see the marginal effects, ∆). This implies that economic problems were of great 
concerns to voters but had a smaller impact on voters’ electoral preferences since the 
candidates did not present distinct policy alternatives (Lee, G. 1998). 
As with the 1992 presidential election, voters from Cholla were much more likely 
to vote for KDJ than those from Kyongsang were to vote for LHC. Cholla voters, 
however, were inclined to vote for RIJ in the competition between RIJ and LHC, while 
voters from Kyongsang did not show a meaningful difference in their preference between 
RIJ and LHC. This can be explained by Cholla voters’ opposition orientation and hatred 
for the incumbent party candidate, LHC. As KYS and CJY did not provide voters from 
Kyongsang with definite regional distinctions in 1992, the two candidates, LHC and RIJ, 
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were not distinctive to Kyongsang voters in terms of regional identity in 1997. RIJ was 
one of the ruling party candidates and appealed to swing voters, including some voters 
from Kyongsang and young voters, by campaigning to end old politics dominated by the 
“three Kims” and hopeless regionalism. That is, for both voters from Kyongsang and for 
many non-regional voters, the competition between LHC and RIJ was not about regions 
but about new faces and new politics. Thus, as the negative coefficient of age indicates, 
the younger a voter was, the more likely he or she was to vote for RIJ than for LHC. Age 
did not influence individual vote choice between KDJ and LHC. 
Opposition-party orientated voters were more likely to vote for either KDJ or RIJ 
than respondents who did not have party orientation, while the ruling-party oriented were 
more likely to vote for LHC. Ruling-party oriented voters did not show significant 
differences in their electoral preferences between the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-
sam, and the opposition party candidate in the 1992 presidential election. Compared with 
Kim Young-sam in 1992, LHC seemed to be better recognized as a ruling party 
candidate, as LHC used to be a prime minister during the Kim Young-sam 
administration. The likeability of candidates in 1997 still influenced voters’ candidate 
preferences more than the economy on individual vote choice. Under the circumstance 
where no clear issue or ideological differences exist between the candidates, it may be 
inevitable that individuals vote based on candidates’ personalities. Korean voters did not 
take account of their ideology or social status measured by their education and family 
income when they made their electoral choice in 1997. 
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 In short, sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations were not statistically significant 
in contrast to the expectation that when economic crisis exist, economic conditions will 
be more accessible and thus more likely to influence vote choice. Furthermore, lifetime 
economic experience under the ruling party did not greatly influence individual vote 
choice. Voters who blamed the incumbent party for the financial crisis, however, 
punished the incumbent party candidate. Even the effect of the economic crisis was 
smaller than the effect of regional identity. In other words, the candidates were 
distinguishable more by regional identity than by economic performance. 
 
3. The 2002 Presidential Election 
 The 2002 presidential election was unique for several reasons. First, the “three 
Kims,” who had dominated Korean politics and intensified regionalism for 30 years, had 
retreated from politics by 2002. As a result, new political figures had emerged. The 
change began with the 2000 National Assembly election, which brought new faces to the 
political arena. Many newly elected representatives had been heavily involved in 
democratization protests during the 1980s and 1990s and were characterized as young 
and progressive. Furthermore, Roh Moo-hyun, a human rights lawyer who was active in 
the democratic and labor movements, appeared as a presidential candidate of the 
incumbent party, the New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP). Second, generational 
replacement helped cause the changes in parliamentary representatives and in influential 
political figures. In other words, the younger generation known as the “386 generation”—
who were born in the 1960s, attended college in the 1980s, and actively participated in 
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democratization protests in the late 1980s—not only constituted a significant voting 
block but also emerged as new political elites by participating in government (Lee, H. 
2003).  
Finally, several important issues emerged, such as aid to North Korea and Status 
of Force Agreement (SOFA) reform, that provoked and divided the public along the issue 
positions and ideology, unlike previous elections in which had no substantial issues 
existed. When Kim Dae-jung was in power, he declared clear principles of inter-Korean 
relations, known as the “sunshine policy,” which separated politics from economics and 
engaged North Korea (Park 1999; Yoon 2000). Kim Dae-Jung was the first president who 
consistently pursued an engagement policy toward the North. Conservatives and the 
opposition party criticized the government’s one-sided policy by arguing that it only 
benefited the North (Ha 2001). Furthermore, Roh Moo-hyun, who was the incumbent 
party candidate in 2002, was more progressive than the other presidential candidates, 
expressing anti-Americanism and other perceived radical views (Lee, H. 2003). When 
two Korean middle-school girls were killed in 2002 by an American armored vehicle in a 
military exercise, anti-Americanism became another influential issue in the election. 
Many Koreans demanded more autonomy and an equal relationship between the U.S. and 
Korea by reforming the current SOFA. In short, these issues had the potential to 
overshadow factors that had dominated Korean elections by offering clear differences 
between candidates. In other words, the presence of new factors might reveal different 
patterns of voting behavior in 2002 from the 1992 and the 1997 presidential elections.  
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 In 2002, only two main candidates ran for president: Roh Moo-hyun, the ruling 
New Millennium Democratic Party candidate, and Lee Hoe-Chang, the opposition Grand 
National Party candidate. A third candidate, Chung Mong-jun, the sixth son of Chung Ju-
yung, the founder of Hyundai, withdrew his candidacy after consenting to a public 
opinion poll that asked Korean voters to choose between Roh and Chung for the single 
candidacy.21 Despite economic adversity, Roh defeated Lee by 2.3 percent, receiving 
significant support from the Cholla region.22  
 The 2002 election could have provided an opportunity to test whether the 
experience of the 1997 economic crisis and generational change facilitated economic 
voting in Korea. Unfortunately the survey data in 2002 did not include economic 
evaluation questions. Instead, I use a variable that taps retrospective evaluations on 
general performance of Kim Dae-jung’s administration.  
With the retirement of old politicians, generational change, and the development 
of new issues, the pattern of voting behavior seemed to change in the 2002 election. 
Ideology, age, and issues such as aid to North Korea became statistically significant for 
the first time in Korean elections. That is, unlike in the previous elections, regional 
identity intertwined with candidate likeability and party orientation was not the only 
important factor that determined individual vote choice. Particularly, as candidates took 
                                                 
21 Using a public opinion poll is an unusual way to select a nominee for any elected positions. However, 
Chung and Roh agreed to hold a public opinion poll for the single candidacy even though they were not in 
the same party. They were afraid of splitting votes between them, which might result in Lee Hoe-chang’s 
victory. Chung Mong-jun campaigned for Roh but pulled out his endorsement of Roh a few hours before 
the official end of the campaign.  
22 See Table AI-9 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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clear positions on aid to North Korea, they made it easy for voters to cast their ballots on 
the basis of that issue. 
 
Table 4-8. Probit Estimates for the 2002 Election 
 
Lee Hoe-chang (LHC)/  
Roh Moo-hyun (RMH) 
Variables 
M.L.E. (S.E.) ∆ 
Economic Variables 
Retrospective 
Lifetime economic experience 
Regional Identity 
Region 1 (Cholla) 









Aid to North Korea 



































Log Likelihood -538.290 
LR 2χ  602.925** 
Pseudo 2R  .359 
% Predicted Correctly 79.7% 
% Reduction in Error 50.0% 
N 1244 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Roh Moo-hyun are normalized at zero. 2. 
Marginal effects (∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the 
independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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The general evaluation of job handling affected individual vote choice in the 
expected way. A respondent who evaluated Kim Dae-jung’s administration as poor was 
more likely to vote for the challenger than for the incumbent. The interpretation of the 
effect, however, should be cautious. The variable included evaluations not only on 
economic performance but also in other areas, such as improvement in the relationship 
with North Korea (e.g., KDJ’s sunshine policy that appeases North Korea by offering aid) 
and in domestic problems (e.g., economic reform).  
Even with a broader indicator of retrospective evaluation, regional identity was 
still an influential factor. Ohn (2004) has argued that regionalism was even stronger in 
2002 than in any other elections. My results also show that compared with the marginal 
effect of regional identity in the previous elections, the marginal effect of Cholla regional 
identity was still significantly large in 2002. How can stronger regional voting in 2002 be 
explained, despite generational replacements in both the public and political elites and the 
rise of conflicting issues? Both candidates in the 2002 election were not from the regions 
their parties traditionally represented. The only constant was parties based on regional 
affiliation. The higher regionalism in 2002 can be explained by the fact that there were 
only two main presidential candidates, rather than three or more (Kang, W. 2003). Kim 
Young-sam shared his support from Kyongsang with Chung Ju-yung in 1992 and Lee 
Hoe-chang shared Kyongsang votes with Rhee In-je in 1997. However, Lee Hoe-chang 
did not have to compete for voters from Kyongsang in 2002. Kim Dae-jung’s popularity 
in Cholla, as well as the region’s animosity against Lee Hoe-chang, contributed to one-
sided support for Roh Moo-hyun by voters from Cholla. That is, the power struggle 
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between the two regions, Kyongsang and Cholla, and the hostility against rival regional 
leaders prevailed over substantial issues, causing the perpetuation of regionalism (Kang, 
D. 2003).  
Other explanations could be that regional parties best represented regional 
interests or that the new issues actually divided regions further by coinciding with 
regional cleavages. For a new cleavage to replace an existing political one, the new 
cleavage must cut across the traditional one so that different political groups form 
coalitions on different dimensions and produce a partisan realignment (Lin, Chu, and 
Hinich 1996). As Table 4-9 shows, however, the new issues tended to further divide the 
country by region. Voters from Cholla were prone to support unconditional aid to North 
Korea, which was initiated by Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy. They also supported 
abolishing or reforming the National Security Law, which strictly prohibited any pro-
communist activity. On the other hand, voters and candidates from Kyongsang tended to 
be opposed to these two issues. In other words, these new issues reinforced the existing 
cleavages rather than crosscutting and realigning the electorate. This suggests that we 
cannot simply attribute the surprisingly strong regionalism in 2002 to Korean voters’ 
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Table 4-9. Regional Differences on Various Issues in 2002 
Aid to North Korea National Security Law Reform Region 
Mean (Std.) Mean (Std.) 
Cholla 3.565(1.264) 3.406(1.221) 
Kyongsang 2.812(1.311) 3.128(1.309) 
Other Regions 3.024(1.373) 3.121(1.345) 
F-TEST F=28.84 (p =.000) F=5.25 (p =.005) 
Note: All paired mean differences are statistically significant in the case of Aid to North Korea, 
while only the mean difference between Cholla and Kyongsang in National Security Law Reform 
is statistically significant.  
 
 While age affected individual vote choice, other demographic variables, such as 
education and family income, still did not. The older a voter was the more likely he or 
she was to vote for Lee than for Roh. In short, regional voting prevailed in the 2002 
presidential election, as regional identity became more accessible and distinguishable 
along with the development of new issues that reinforced regional identity. However, the 
significance of other factors, such as general performance of the incumbent, issues, and 
ideology, implies that as long as candidates differentiate themselves on those matters, 
voters take such factors into account when they choose their candidates. 
 
V. Salience of Candidates, Party Orientations, and Regional Identity 
 
The findings on the three Korean presidential elections of 1992, 1997, and 2002 
indicate tenuous evidence of economic voting. There seems to be little evidence of 
pocketbook voting and economic voting based on lifetime economic experience in Korea. 
Sociotropic evaluation was statistically significant in 1992 but Korean voters did not 
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behave as typical economic voters who punish the incumbent for a bad national economy. 
Voters who evaluated the national economy as worse were more likely to vote for the 
incumbent party candidate in 1992. In 1997, respondents chose their candidate based on 
their attribution of responsibility for the economic crisis rather than on their subjective 
perception of economic conditions. This implies that Korean voters responded to the 
economic crisis but not to short-term economic evaluations. The results of the 2002 
election show that voters considered the current administration’s performance on various 
national affairs, including the economy, when deciding their vote choice. This suggests 
that Korean voters may be more involved in economic voting in future elections, since 
they have now experienced both the ruling and opposition parties in power, which makes 
it possible for voters to compare the economic performances of the parties.   
While the impact of economic conditions on electoral choices seems to be flimsy, 
there are several variables that consistently have affected Korean voters’ preferences, 
including candidates’ likeability, party orientation (PID), and regional identity. 
Interestingly, these variables are highly correlated. Compared to respondents in any other 
region, fewer respondents from Cholla were closer to a government-party orientation, 
while more respondents from Kyongsang were closer to government-party orientation 
until 1997.23 This changed as the government party changed in 1997. That is, after 2002, 
government-party orientation indicated previous opposition-party orientation, and vice 
versa. More respondents from the Cholla region aligned themselves closer to a 
government-party orientation, while more respondents from Kyongsang identified 
                                                 
23 See Table AI-7 in Appendix I for t test. 
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themselves with an opposition-party orientation. All the information from party-
orientation, region, and political leaders strengthened voters’ predisposition toward their 
regional identity. 
To summarize, region of origin was a powerful factor that shaped individual 
political decisions in Korea through the 2002 election. Regional identity not only had a 
direct impact on individual vote choice but was closely associated with issue positions 
and party identification, which also influenced individual vote choice. The different 
experience of individuals as members of a particular region in the process of economic 
and political development has constructed unique identities, which, as a perceptual 




 This chapter discussed the question of whether economic conditions and regional 
identities were available, accessible, and distinctive enough to bear on individual vote 
choice in Korea in the three presidential elections between 1992 and 2002. Many Koreans 
have thought that economic issues (e.g., inflation and economic growth) are one of the 
most important concerns and that the government is responsible for poverty or economic 
conditions (see Tables 4-1 and 4-2). In spite of the importance of economic issues, the 
significance of economic evaluations in elections seems to be modest. Considering the 
results of multinomial probit regressions in 1992 and 1997, my vote choice models found 
little evidence of traditional reward-punish voting, while regional identity and candidate 
  95 
likeability had a persistent impact on Korean voters’ electoral decisions. Attribution of 
responsibility for the economic crisis of 1997 influenced vote choice in that election, but 
the effect was smaller than other determinants, such as regional identity, candidate 
likeability, and party orientation. As regional identity has been chronically accessible and 
linked to other attitudes (e.g., party orientations, candidate likeability, etc.), it has 
overshadowed the effect of economic evaluations on individual vote choice. Emotional 
attachment to social identity rather than personal/national material well-being tends to 
shape individual political preferences when social cleavages rooted in identity exist. 
Finally, the results of the 2002 presidential election imply that unless an issue emerges 
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 In this chapter, I address my research questions by analyzing three presidential 
elections in Taiwan (1996, 2000, and 2004). In this chapter, I ask the following questions: 
How are both economic conditions and identity issues relevant to individual vote choice 
in Taiwan? And under what circumstances do economic conditions or national identity 
matter more? Based on the assumption that attitudes must be available, accessible, and 
distinctive to bear on individual electoral choices, I begin by studying whether economic 
conditions and national identity have been available in Taiwanese elections and the 
degree of their accessibility and distinctiveness. Second, I present my research design, 
using either multinomial or binary logistic regressions and introducing variables and 
models specific to the Taiwanese case. Third, I analyze the effect of economic 
evaluations and national identity on individual candidate preferences in the elections of 
1996, 2000, and 2004. Finally, I discuss how pre-existing social divisions based on 
national identity influenced the distinctiveness of alternatives in these elections and thus 
produced varying effects of the same factors in each election. I also provide implications 
of the empirical results on the effects of economic conditions and national identity in 
future Taiwanese elections.  
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II. Economic Conditions and National Identity: Evidence of the Availability, 
Accessibility, and Distinctiveness in Taiwanese Elections 
 
1. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of Economic Conditions 
 For economic conditions to bear on individual vote choice, attitudes about 
economic conditions must be available to individual voters. In other words, voters must 
form an opinion about economic conditions and relate that opinion to politics. Like in 
other one party-states, a single party, the Kuomintang (KMT), controlled the economy in 
Taiwan for six decades by targeting a particular industry or sector for growth and 
encouraging the private sectors to invest resources in that industry in each economic 
development stage. As the KMT never lost its dominance in any government institution 
until the late 1990s, Taiwanese voters clearly recognized who was responsible for all 
economic changes (Hsieh, Lacy, and Niou 1998). Even though both Taiwan and Korea 
witnessed one-party dominance, the attribution of responsibility for economic conditions 
was easier in Taiwan than in Korea. The succession of the ruling parties in Korea was 
very complicated, while the KMT was the only ruling party in Taiwan from 1949 to 
2000. The Taiwanese were particularly known to attribute responsibility for stock market 
fluctuations to the government (Wu 2001). The 2001 legislative election survey by 
Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS) asked who had the greatest impact 
on government policies. More than 60 percent of the respondents named the president, 
the legislative body, or the premier, which implies that many Taiwanese voters attributed 
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responsibility for the national economy to national political figures. In short, attitudes 
toward national economic conditions have been available to Taiwanese voters.  
 
Table 5-1. The Most Important Issue that Taiwan Faces Now, 1996, 2000, and 2004 (%) 









































N 1396 1409 1823 
Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior, 1996 
and 2000, and The Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies (TEDS), 2004. 
 
 In order to affect voters’ choices, attitudes about economic conditions must also 
be accessible. Economic conditions must be one of the issues at “the top of the head” so 
that voters can easily retrieve their opinions about economic conditions when making 
their political decisions (Zaller 1992, p. 1). Because the subjective importance of 
economic conditions indicates more frequent activation and links to other attitudes, I 
examine how important economic issues were to Taiwanese voters. As Table 5-1 
indicates, approximately 30 percent of Taiwanese respondents reported that the economy 
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was the most important problem Taiwan faced over the three elections, compared with 
46, 70, and 81 percent in the Korean cases. This disparity can be explained by the format 
of the question. While the Korean election survey questions demanded the respondents 
choose from a list, the questions posed to Taiwanese respondents were open-ended. Many 
Taiwanese respondents answered that various issues could be the most important 
problem. Considering the survey format, however, a larger proportion of the Taiwanese 
respondents reported that economic issues—economic growth and unemployment—were 
most important, showing that economic conditions were accessible to Taiwanese voters 
more than any other individual issue in 2000 and 2004. Identity issues, including the 
issue of ethnic harmony, cross-strait relation, and Taiwan’s independence, were 
considered the most important issues in 1996 and the second most important issues in 
2000 and 2004. Crime was another important issue in 1996 but its importance was 
significantly reduced in 2000 and 2004. 
 The final and key condition for economic conditions to have a bearing on 
individual vote choice is the distinctiveness of candidates and parties in terms of 
economic performance. In other words, candidates or parties must show their ability to 
handle the economy, and voters must perceive the difference between the alternatives 
with respect to economic performance. As the KMT had never lost power in any branch 
of government until the 2000 presidential election, however, opposition parties did not 
have an opportunity to prove their willingness or ability to carry out their policy 
promises. Taiwanese voters, therefore, had little information about the opposition party’s 
capability to handle the economy before the year 2000, when the main opposition party, 
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DPP, took over the presidency. Taiwanese voters could better recognize the difference 
between KMT and DPP on the basis of economic performance after the 2000 election, 
when voters had experienced both parties in power. In short, candidates and parties were 
less distinctive in terms of economic performance in the 1996 and the 2000 presidential 
election than in 2002.  
Economic conditions were both available and accessible to voters in Taiwan in 
the elections discussed in this chapter. The distinctiveness, however, has varied over the 
three elections as Taiwan experienced a power transition from the dominant party to the 
opposition party in 2000. I expect no economic voting in 1996 and 2000 since voters 
could not easily reject the known party in favor of the unknown due to a short-term 
economic recession unless payoffs from the changes indisputably outweighed the status 
quo (Key 1966). On the other hand, I expect evidence of economic voting in 2004 since 
attitudes toward economic conditions were not only available and accessible but also 
distinctive. 
 
2. The Availability, Accessibility, and Distinctiveness of National Identity 
 The availability of national identity refers to whether voters in Taiwan are aware 
of their national identity and its political relevance. The availability of national identity 
defined as psychological attachment to a political community or sovereign state is 
measured by asking whether Taiwanese individuals identify themselves with Taiwanese, 
Chinese, or both (Ho and Liu 2001; Schubert 2004; Wang and Liu 2004). Taiwanese 
identifiers tend to perceive that they have different political and cultural identity from 
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Chinese, while Chinese identifiers do not. Another group of Taiwanese relates 
themselves politically to Taiwan but culturally to China thus obtaining a dual identity 
(Chu 2004; Wang and Liu 2004). Figure 5-1 shows that most respondents to the surveys 
by the Election Survey Center of National Chengchi University expressed their national 
identity as either Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, while those who chose “Non-response” 
were around 11% between 1992 and 2004. Furthermore, considering that all non-
responses do not mean “no opinion,” it can be concluded that an even higher percentage 
of respondents had formed opinions about their national identity. 
 

















































































Taiwanese Both Taiwanese and Chinese Chinese Non response
Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution. 
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 For national identity to influence individual vote choice, opinions about national 
identity must be accessible so that individual voters are ready to utilize the opinions for 
electoral decisions. The accessibility of national identity is measured by subjective 
importance, since important attitudes tend to be more accessible. However, Table 5-1 
indicates that few respondents reported that national identity (or ethnic harmony) was the 
most important problem Taiwan faced (5.1% in 1996, 3.1% in 2000, and 3.2% in 2004). 
Another way to measure the accessibility is to examine whether national identity is linked 
to other attitudes. When an attitude is connected with other important attitudes, this is 
more likely to be activated. The issue of national identity is closely related to, and 
perhaps even inseparable from, the issue of cross-strait relations and the 
independence/unification (Ho and Liu 2001; Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996). Therefore, if 
we treat these three issues together, national identity was the most or second most 
important issue to Taiwanese between 1996 and 2004.  
Table 5-2 shows that national identity is significantly associated with the issue of 
independence-unification, party identification, and candidate likeability, which remind of 
identity differences. Respondents who closely identified themselves as Chinese tended to 
support Taiwan’s unification with China. They also felt closer to either the KMT, the 
New Party (NP), or the People First Party (PFP) and liked Lien and Soong more than 
Chen. On the other hand, respondents who more closely identified with Taiwanese were 
more likely to support Taiwan’s independence and to associate themselves with the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). They also 
tended to like Chen more than the other candidates. In short, national identity is closely 
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associated with party identification, likeability of candidates, and the issue of Taiwanese 
independence/unification, all of which make national identity more accessible. 
 
Table 5-2. Pairwise Correlations between National Identity and Other Attitudes in 1996, 
2000, and 2004 
 
Other Attitudes National Identity 
 1996 2000 2004 
Independence -.025** -.329** -.350** 
Unification .299** .377** .299** 
Status quo -.079** -.062** .084** 
KMT .128** .188** .337** 
DPP -.252** -.281** -.415** 
NP .200** .018** -.005 
PFP N/A .229** .219** 
TSU N/A N/A -.139** 
Likeability of Lien Chan N/A .050** .276** 
Likeability of Chen Shui-bian N/A -.269** -.386** 
Likeability of Soong James N/A .316** .339** 
Note: National identity in 1996 and 2000 is 3-point scale: 1 for Taiwanese identifiers, 2 for dual 
identifiers, and 3 for Chinese identifiers. National identity in 2004 is 5-point scale: 1 for 
Taiwanese identifiers, 2 for Taiwanese and Chinese identifiers, 3 for dual identifiers, and 4 for 
Chinese and Taiwanese identifiers, and 5 for Chinese identifiers. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
  
The final and key element that mediates the effect of national identity is the 
distinctiveness of candidates in relation to national identity. The first opposition party, the 
DPP, proclaimed itself as the party of Taiwanese natives to differentiate itself from the 
KMT, which was dominated by elites from mainland China. In spite of the KMT’s 
indigenization effort since the 1970s, different views on Taiwan’s future (independence 
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or unification with China) were inseparable from national identity and magnified 
differences between parties with respect to national identity. The issue of 
independence/unification differentiates Taiwanese political parties by structuring and 
changing the party systems in Taiwan, and thus has become the most important issue in 
the competition of political parties (Cheng and Hsu 1996; Chan 2005; Schubert 2004). 
Therefore, the more clearly parties position themselves on the independence/unification 
spectrum, the easier voters distinguish parties in terms of national identity.  
 






































Source: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution. 
Note: A 3-point scale from independence (one) to unification (three) was used in 1996 and 2000. 
An 11-point scale from independence (zero) to unification (ten) was used in 2004.  
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 Figure 5-2 indicates that Taiwanese voters clearly recognized the different 
positions of political parties on national identity in each election. All paired mean 
differences are statistically significant.24 Voters perceived that the DPP (or the “pan-
green camp”) was pro-independence and supported “One Taiwan,” while the KMT and 
other KMT splinters (or the “pan-blue camp”) were pro-unification and embraced “One 
China.” Even though the parties have not changed their fundamental stance on national 
identity, they have emphasized or deemphasized the issue of Taiwanese independence for 
electoral purposes. The candidates in 1996 and 2000 seemed less pronounced in their 
stances on the independence/unification, while the candidates in the two camps in 2004—
the pan-blue and pan-green—made their views on the Taiwanese independence clearer. 
While 30% to 46% of the respondents reported either “don’t know” or “ambiguous” on 
each candidate’s position on the issue in 1996 and 2000, only 15% to 18% of the 
respondents selected either one in 2004. Particularly, during the 2000 presidential 
campaign Chen Shui-bian, the DPP candidate in 2000, tried to modify his image as a pro-
independence hard-liner and embrace a moderate position (Alagappa 2001; Diamond 
2001). Lien Chan, the successor of Lee Teng-hui, seemed to inherit Lee’s ambiguous 
stance on national identity. Respondents viewed Soong more pro-unification than Lien. 
However, the mean difference between Lien and Chen is still statistically significant. The 
NP and the PFP, which have splintered from the KMT, have been perceived as strong 
pro-unification parties across the three elections. In 2004, the two-way competition 
between one candidate from the pan-blue camp of pro-unification parties and the other 
                                                 
24 See Table AI-11 in Appendix I for detail. 
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from the pan-green coalition of pro-independence parties, made it easy for voters to 
recognize the difference between the candidates in regard with national identity. 
 All the evidence suggests that national identity has been available, accessible, and 
distinctive to Taiwanese voters throughout the three presidential elections. However, I 
expect stronger national identity voting in the competition in 2004 than in 1996 and 2000 
because the two-way competition provided clear alternatives between parties in terms of 
national identity in 2004, as expressed in the following: 
Year Economic Voting Identity Voting 
1996 No Yes 
2000 No Yes 
2004 Yes Yes 
 
 The following section studies the effects of both economic conditions and 
national identity on Taiwanese voters’ electoral preferences through empirical analyses. 
First, I present the data, variables, and models that I use to test my expectations for the 
effects of economic conditions and national identity. Second, I provide either 
multinomial or binary probit results. Finally, I discuss the implication of the empirical 
results. 
 
III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models 
 
In this section, I analyze three presidential elections (1996, 2000, and 2004) to 
examine the effects of economic conditions and national identity. The data for the 1996 
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presidential election come from An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior directed 
by John F.S. Hsieh between August 1995 and July 1996. The 2000 presidential election 
data were also collected by the An Interdisciplinary Study of Voting Behavior (August 
1999 to July 2000) project conducted by Yih-yan Chen. The dataset for the 2004 
presidential election comes from the Taiwan Election and Democratization Studies 
(TEDS) directed by Shiow duan Hawang (December 2003 to May 2005). The dependent 
variable is individual vote choice.  
 
1. Independent Variables and Measurements:  
 My model considers the following variables: sociotropic and pocketbook 
evaluations, lifetime economic experience, party identification, national identity, and 
demographic factors. The measurements for retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook 
evaluations are similar to the measurements used in the Korean cases above. Sociotropic 
evaluation is measured by individual perceptions of changes in the national economy 
over the past year, and pocketbook evaluation is measured by individual perceptions of 
changes in their individual’s personal or family financial situation over the previous year 
measured on 5-point scales from better-off to worse-off.  
Individual lifetime economic experience is second economic variable. As 
discussed in the Korean cases, it is important to take into account lifetime economic 
experience in a dominant one-party system. One-party dominance was more pronounced 
in Taiwan than in Korea. While there was a confusing succession of the dominant parties 
in Korea, Taiwan was a one-party state led by the KMT for four decades. The KMT 
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never lost its power in any government branch between 1949 and 2000. Therefore, the 
asymmetry of information between the dominant party and the opposition parties was 
more severe in Taiwan than in Korea. As Aldrich and Magaloni’s study (2006) on 
Mexican and Taiwanese elections show, voters who experienced good economic fortunes 
under the KMT rule might be less likely to punish the KMT for short-term economic 
downturns. In other words, this variable is also expected to have an interactive 
relationship with short-term economic evaluations. To measure long-term economic 
experience, I use GDP growth from 1952 forward, published online by the National 
Statistics of the Republic of China.25 I apply the same formula that I employed in the 
Korean cases by following Aldrich and Magaloni’s formula (2006). I assume that 
respondents who were born before 1942 have the same lifetime economic experience.  
National identity is the second main interest variable. As a psychological 
attachment or a feeling of belonging to a political community, national identity indicates 
an individual’s identification with a particular territory, history, culture, and political 
system. National identity is measured by whether a voter identified himself or herself as 
Chinese, Taiwanese, or both. As discussed above, national identity is inseparable from 
the issue of Taiwan’s independence from China, and those who identify as Taiwanese 
tend to support Taiwanese independence, while those who identify as Chinese promote 
unification with China. Thus, many scholars tend to treat the issue of 
independence/unification as an alternative measure of national identity (Hsiao and Cheng 
1999; Hsieh 1996; Wang and Lin 2004). The issue of independence/unification, however, 
                                                 
25 http://eng.stat.gov.tw 
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captures individual political opinions on Taiwan’s future status but not individual 
affection to a particular culture and political community (Wang and Liu 2004). Therefore, 
asking whether a voter considers himself or herself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both is a 
better measurement of national identity because it includes a psychological attachment to 
both culture and political community. National identity is measured by a three-point scale 
from Taiwanese, to both, to Chinese in both 1996 and 2000, and by a five-point from 
Taiwanese, Taiwanese and Chinese, both, Chinese and Taiwanese, to Chinese in 2004.  
Party identification (PID) in Taiwan is replaced by dummy variables that indicate 
support for a particular party. Political parties in Taiwan cannot be positioned on the 
ideological spectrum from liberal to conservative but rather tend to be formed by political 
leaders who pursue the presidency or have different positions on Taiwan’s independence 
issue (Cheng and Hsu 1996). In the 1996 presidential election, there were three main 
political parties—Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and New 
Party (NP). Right after the 2000 presidential election, James Soong, then-governor of the 
Taiwan Province, defected from the KMT to launch the People First Party (PFP). 
Because the 2000 presidential election survey was conducted after the PFP was formed, 
the respondents could choose among KMT, DPP, NP, and PFP for their party 
identification. Finally, after Lee Teng-hui briefly withdrew from politics in 2000, he 
came back and founded the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) in 2001. In the 2004 
presidential election, parties were divided into two camps: the pan-green, a coalition of 
KMT and PFP that advocated unification, and the pan-blue, a coalition of DPP and TSU 
that supported independence.  
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 The final category of variables captures demographic characteristics of 




I employ the multinomial probit (MNP) model to analyze the 1996 and 2000 
presidential elections, which had more than two candidates, while I use the probit model 
for the 2004 presidential election, which had only two candidates. The incumbent party 
candidate is the baseline so that a positive sign suggests a higher probability of voting for 
the opposition party candidate in each column.  
 
IV. Empirical Analyses 
 
1. The 1996 Presidential Election 
 The 1996 presidential election is significant in that Taiwanese voters elected their 
president through a competitive and democratic election for the first time. In addition to 
the DPP candidate, Peng Ming-min, the KMT candidate, Lee Teng-hui, faced two more 
independent candidates, Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an, who were both former KMT 
leaders. Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University in 1995, which was viewed by China 
as an effort to pursue Taiwan’s independence, brought about Chinese military exercises 
in the Taiwan Strait and military threats in 1995 and 1996. The military threat affected 
the economy, resulting in a high unemployment rate and plunging stock market (Cheng 
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1997; Tien 1996b). Despite an economic slowdown and tensions across the strait, Lee 
Teng-hui was elected by winning more than 50 percent of the popular votes.26 
  
Table 5-3. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1996 Presidential Election            
 
Peng/Lee Lin/Lee Variables 



































































Log Likelihood -296.761 
N 890 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Lee are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (∆) indicate 
the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and 
discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
The empirical results in Table 5-3 show that voter evaluations of national and 
personal economic conditions were not an important factor in choosing between Lee and 
Peng. On the other hand, sociotropic evaluation had a substantial effect on individual 
vote choice between Lee and Lin. Uncertainty about the opposition party candidate 
                                                 
26 See AI-12 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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prevented voters from selecting their candidate (Lee or Peng) on the basis of 
retrospective economic evaluations. On the other hand, Lin’s experience in the KMT 
government lessened the uncertainty about his ability to handle the economy.27 
Therefore, voters could punish the incumbent Lee for the worsened national economy by 
choosing Lin. 
Lifetime economic experience also did not influence individual vote choice 
between Lee and Peng, while it did affect the choice between Lee and Lin. Voters who 
experienced a high average economic growth were more likely to vote for the incumbent 
Lee than the challenger Lin. In short, economic factors were not a significant concern for 
individuals’ electoral decision between Lee and Peng, while both lifetime economic 
experience and short-term economic conditions had a significant impact on choosing 
between Lee and Lin.  
National identity was one of the determinants of individual vote choice in 1996 
between Lee and Peng, but not between Lee and Lin. Even though China’s threats against 
Lee’s election and Lee’s promotion of Taiwanese identity tended to blur the difference 
between Lee and Peng, voters still perceived that the KMT was the party of the Chinese 
and the DPP was the party of the Taiwanese. As Lin defected from the KMT, Lin’s ticket 
was not much different from the KMT in terms of national identity.   
Party identification and level of education also significantly influenced individual 
electoral choice. Considering that the issue of independence/unification, an alternative 
indicator of national identity, has been the most important underpinning of party 
                                                 
27 Lin Yang-kang was served as Vice Premier of the Republic of China from 1984-1987 and President of 
the Judicial Yuan from 1987-1994 among others. 
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formation and realignment in Taiwan, the significance of PID might also indicate that 
voters considered each party’s official position or reputation on national identity. Even 
though Lin ran as an independent, he was endorsed by the NP, perceived as an adamant 
Chinese party. Finally, the more highly educated were more likely to vote for the 
challengers. 
In short, national identity, not economic concerns, was the most significant factor 
that determined individual vote choice between Peng and Lee when voters clearly 
differentiated the candidates in terms of national identity. On the other hand, Taiwanese 
voters responded to short-term economic changes in the nation and lifetime economic 
experience when they did not view much difference between Lin and Lee in terms of 
national identity but had information about or confidence in the opposition party 
candidate’s experience with the economy. 
 
2. The 2000 Presidential Election 
 The presidential election of 2000 was a three-way competition between the KMT 
party’s Chan Lien, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian, and the independent James Soong, who 
defected from the KMT to run for the presidency. This election brought about the first 
alternation of power in the Taiwanese presidency when Chen Shui-bian won the election, 
defeating Chan Lien by 16 percent and Soong by less than 2 percent.28 This election 
epitomized the completion of the Taiwanization of politics and provided greater 
confidence in the Taiwanese democratic system (Alagappa 2001). Table 5-1 shows that 
                                                 
28 See Table AI-13 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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more Taiwanese people cared about the economy in 2000 than in 1996, while fewer 
people were concerned about national identity issues, including ethnic harmony, cross-
strait relations, and Taiwan’s independence in 2000 than in 1996. At the time of election, 
62 percent of the respondents reported that the national economy was worsening.29 In 
other words, if voters considered their evaluations of macro economic conditions, the 
incumbent party candidate, Chan Lien, should have been hurt. Evaluations of the national 
economy, however, did not affect individual vote choice. On the other hand, life-time 
economic experience with the dominant party KMT had a significant effect on individual 
vote choice both between Chen and Lien and between Soong and Lien. Voters who had 
had a good economic experience throughout the KMT’s rule were more likely to vote for 
the KMT candidate, Chan Lien. The significant effects of lifetime economic experience 
in 1996 and 2000 suggest that Taiwanese voters were more likely to respond to long-term 
economic conditions rather than short-term economic changes probably due to the fact 
Taiwanese voters had a long experience with a one-party dominant system. Voters who 
witnessed a good economy under the KMT rule might not readily unseat the incumbent 






                                                 
29 See Table AI-14 in Appendix I for the distribution of responses on individual evaluation of the national 
economy. 
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Table 5-4. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 2000 Presidential Election            
 
Chen/Lien Soong/Lien Variables 
M.L.E. (S.E.) ∆ M.L.E. (S.E.) ∆ 
Economic Variables 
Sociotropic 
































































Log Likelihood 1084 
N -609.305 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lien (KMT) are normalized at zero. 2. 
Marginal effects (∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the 
independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.  
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
While national identity influenced individual vote choice between only the DPP 
candidate and the KMT candidate in 1996, it affected vote choice both between Chen 
Shui-bian and Chan Lien and between James Soong and Chan Lien in 2000. The more a 
voter identified himself or herself as Taiwanese the more likely she or he was to vote for 
the DPP candidate, Chen, than the KMT candidate, Lien. On the other hand, the more a 
voter considered himself or herself as Chinese, the more likely she or he was to vote for 
Soong than Lien. The marginal effect of national identity in the choice of Chen/Lien is 
smaller than that in the choice of Soong/Lien (∆: -.106 vs. 165). Chen tried to 
  116 
deemphasize national identity and tone down his extreme pro-independence stance since 
voters were afraid of any drastic change or uncertainty in the cross-strait relation 
(Alagappa 2001; Diamond 2001; Wu 2001). The incumbent party candidate, Lien, could 
not position himself far from the popular incumbent’s moderate (even pro-independence) 
position on national identity. Respondents believed that Lien favored the status quo 
(30.05%) or had an ambiguous policy (35.74%) rather than supported unification 
(27.28%). Chen’s strategic campaigns and Lee Teng-hui’s pursuit of a separate national 
identity lessened the differences between the DPP’s and KMT’s candidates. On the other 
hand, Soong and Lien were more distinguishable in terms of national identity. Soong 
preferred the status quo, but his long-term vision for Taiwan was for “One China” 
(Diamond 2001; Schubert 2004). Furthermore, Lee Teng-hui’s campaign against Soong 
contributed to a clear distinction between Lien and Soong (Diamond 2001).  
 As in 1996, party identification significantly affected electoral preferences in 
2000. Those who identified with the KMT were more likely to vote for Lien than Chen 
but did not show a clear preference between Soong and Lien. Likewise, voters identified 
with the DPP were more likely to vote for Chen than Lien but did not perceive much 
difference between Soong and Lien. PFP-identified voters were much more likely to vote 
for Soong than Lien, while they did not make a clear choice between Chen and Lien. 
Level of education also influenced individual vote choice. More educated voters were 
more likely to vote for the incumbent party candidate Lien than either Soong or Chen. 
 In sum, while individual evaluation of the short-term national economy was not 
an important factor in the 2000 election, lifetime economic experience with the dominant 
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party significantly affected Taiwanese voters’ electoral decisions. In other words, good 
economic experiences under the KMT hindered economic voting based on individual 
perceptions of short-term national economic conditions. National identity provided a 
clear distinction between Lien and Soong, as well as between Lien and Chen. Chen’s 
moderation and Lee’s effort to establish a separate identity, however, tended to blur the 
difference between Chen and Lien, while setting Lien apart from Soong.  
 
3. The 2004 Presidential Election 
 The 2004 presidential election was a competition between two camps: the “Pan-
Blue” and the “Pan-Green,” which were perceived as supporting different views on 
national identity and cross-strait relations. The pan-blue was a coalition among the KMT, 
the PFP, and the NP, which favored Chinese identity, as well as the unification with 
China. On the other hand, the pan-green was an alliance of the DPP and the TSU and was 
an adamant supporter of a separate national identity for Taiwan. The incumbent Chen 
Shui-bian ran for reelection, representing the pan-green camp, against the challenger Lien 
Chan, who led the pan-blue ticket. In spite of economic and political misfortunes, Chen 
Shui-bian was reelected but by a margin of just 0.22 percent.30 Many people believed that 
Chen would have lost the election without an incident on March 19, shortly before 
election day, in which Chen and his running mate Lu received minor wounds from a 
shooting. The incident was known to generate sympathy votes for Chen and Lu (Chan 
2005).  
                                                 
30 See Table AI-15 in Appendix I for the election result. 
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 After Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan experienced its 
worst economy in decades. As Table 5-1 shows, economic problems were the most 
important issue of the 2004 election. More and more people reported that the economy 
was the most important problem over the three election periods (24% in 1996, 34.2% in 
2000, and 35.9% in 2004). National identity issues were one of the most important issues 
but a smaller percentage of respondents chose those issues as being the most important, 
compared with the percentages in previous years (32.4% in 1996, 24.5% in 2000, and 
22.8% in 2004). Furthermore, unlike in the previous elections, voters now could compare 
the DPP’s performance handling the economy with the KMT’s. Therefore, one might 
expect significant economic voting, since not only were economic conditions available 
and accessible, but also the candidates and parties were distinctive in their ability to 
handle the economy.  
 As expected, sociotropic evaluation had a significant effect on individual vote 
choice. Those who perceived national economic conditions as worsening tended to vote 
for the challenger, Lien. However, there was still no evidence of pocketbook voting. 
Unlike in the previous elections, lifetime economic experience did not significantly affect 
individual vote choice. In other words, once voters experienced other parties in power 
and knew their ability to manage the economy, voters were not afraid of punishing or 
rewarding the incumbent party for short-term economic conditions. This suggests that 
voters under a one-party dominant system tend to base their electoral choice on long-term 
or lifetime economic condition rather than short-term economic condition, while the 
opposite holds true for voters who have witnessed power alternations between parties. 
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Table 5-5. Probit Estimates for the 2004 Election 
 
Lien/Chen Variables 









































Log Likelihood -259.897 
LR 2χ  1112.832** 
Pseudo 2R  .682 
% Predicted Correctly 90.4% 
% Reduction in Error 79.2% 
N 1182 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent Chen are normalized at zero. 2. Marginal effects (∆) indicate 
the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the independent variables and 
discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1.  
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
 National identity still had a significant effect on individual vote choice in 2004. 
The more a respondent considered himself or herself as Chinese, the more likely that 
individual was to vote for Lien from the pan-blue ticket. As a matter of fact, the two 
camps were not much different in terms of their positions on national identity by the time 
of the 2004 presidential election. Both groups supported Taiwanese sovereignty and the 
“Taiwan First” idea, even though their positions on cross-strait relations slightly differed 
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(Shubert 2004). The Campaign of Chen Shui-bian and former president Lee Teng-hui, 
however, mobilized the issue of national identity to move the focus of the election from 
bad economic conditions to other issues, specifically national identity (Wu 2002).  
  As in the two previous elections, party identification and education levels 
significantly affected individual vote choice in 2004. Party identification was measured 
on a five-point scale from “strongly lean to the pan-green” to “strongly lean to the pan-
blue.” The more strongly voters leaned to the pan-blue, the more likely they were to vote 
for Lien. More educated voters tended to prefer the pan-blue candidate Lien to the pan-
green candidate Chen. The more educated were more likely to vote for the challengers in 
both 1996 and 2004, while they were more likely to vote for the incumbent in 2000. In 
other words, the more educated were inclined to support the KMT (pan-blue) candidate 
Lien in 2000 and 2004. Contrary to the expectation, the shooting incident was not a 
determining factor in the election of 2004.  
 To conclude, witnessing power alternations between parties lessened the 
asymmetry of information between the dominant party and opposition parties and thus 
removed the uncertainty about parties that had never been tested. This facilitated 
sociotropic economic voting in 2004. A simplified two-way competition also helped 
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V. Conclusions 
 
 As expected, economic voting was not common in Taiwan before the 2004 
presidential election. On the other hand, national identity significantly affected individual 
vote choice across the three presidential elections in Taiwan. Considering Table 5-1, the 
economy was one of the most important issues and tended to become more important 
over the years. National identity issues intertwined with the independence/unification 
issue and cross-strait relations were also important to Taiwanese voters, but the 
significance seemed to decrease over the three elections. The accessibility of economic 
conditions was not translated to their effects on individual vote choice in the first two 
elections. In other words, the accessibility or subjective importance of an issue does not 
guarantee its effect on later behaviors. Varying degrees of the distinctiveness between the 
alternatives produced different effects of economic conditions and national identity on 
individual vote choice in Taiwan. Unless candidates provided clear distinctions in terms 
of economic performance, there was no way for voters to evaluate the candidates and to 
vote based on economic conditions. For instance, sociotropic evaluation affected 
individual vote choice in the 2004 election. Experience with the DPP-controlled 
government between the years 2000 and 2004 provided voters with a basis for evaluating 
how the two parties, KMT and DPP, managed the economy. On the other hand, the 
candidates in 2000 did not offer clear alternatives in terms of economic performance. Not 
only did the opposition parties in 2000 not have experience of governing the nation but 
also the incumbent party candidate Lien tried to distance himself from the incumbent Lee 
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due to Lee’s risky policies on national identity and cross-strait relations (Diamond 2001). 
That is, it is hard for voters to attribute economic success or failure to Lien.  
In all three elections studied, attitudes toward national identity related with the 
independence-unification issue were available and accessible, and clearly differentiated 
the parties and their candidates (Chu and Lin 1996; Hsiao and Cheng 1999). Even though 
the parties tended to converge to the middle on the issue of independence/unification and 
strategically mobilized or demobilized national identity, national identity consistently 
showed a significant effect on individual vote choice over years. This indicates that 
national identity as a symbol triggering strong emotional responses was chronically 
accessible and distinctive, regardless of elites’ strategic campaigns to lessen its 
importance.  
Taiwanese voters had relied mostly on national identity and party identification 
for their electoral choice before they experienced a power alternation from the dominant 
KMT to the DPP. Without the risk of voting for an unknown, however, voters considered 
national economic conditions in casting their ballots in 2004. The parties’ convergence 
on national identity issues and the increasing accessibility of economic conditions, along 
with worsening economic conditions, may further increase the significance of economic 
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Chapter 6. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Korea and Taiwan 
 
I. Introduction  
 
 The two previous chapters examined the availability, accessibility, and 
distinctiveness of both economic conditions and identity issues and the effects of these 
issues on individual vote choice in Korea and Taiwan by utilizing and improving the 
information-processing approach. The main findings from the empirical analyses are: (1) 
that variations in the accessibility and distinctiveness between candidates produced 
diverse effects of retrospective economic evaluations; and (2) that regional identity in 
Korea and national identity in Taiwan, as chronically accessible and distinctive attitudes, 
consistently had a significant impact on individual vote choice in the countries. While the 
previous chapters sought to find the relevance of economic voting or identity-based 
voting in the two countries, this chapter investigates what types of individuals in these 
two countries are more likely to be involved in economic voting, either sociotropic or 
pocketbook. 
 Under information-processing models, individual characteristics greatly influence 
whether given factors are available, accessible, and distinctive. According to the post-
election surveys conducted by the Institute for Korean Election Studies of 1993 and 1997, 
for example, slightly more than 50 percent of Korean respondents attributed 
responsibility for poverty and economic crisis to government institutions in Korea (see 
Table 4-1 in Chapter 4). The remaining respondents did not relate personal and national 
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economic well-being to governmental actions. The attitude accessibility of economic 
concerns also varied among individuals in Korea and Taiwan. Regarding the question of 
the most important problem, many of the respondents in each country named something 
other than the economy as the most important problem facing their countries (see Table 
4-2 in Chapter 4 and Table 5-1 in Chapter 5). Less than 40 percent of the respondents in 
Taiwan, for instance, listed the economy as the most important problem that the nation 
faced in each of the three presidential elections studied in the previous chapter. In other 
words, the importance and thus the attitude accessibility of the economy differed among 
the electorate within each country. 
 This chapter examines how varying personal backgrounds, such as education and 
lifetime economic experiences, affected the salience of economic conditions and thus 
vote choice in Korea and Taiwan. The following sections present vote choice models for 
each election analyzed in the previous chapters. In each case, however, the primary 
interests are the interactions between education and economic evaluations and between 
lifetime economic experience and economic evaluations. The interactive relationships 
between these variables imply that the impact of economic evaluations on vote choice 
differs depending on education levels and lifetime economic experience (Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder 2006; Braumoeller 2004; Gomez and Wilson 2006). I examine not only the 
significance of the interaction terms but also the total effect of economic evaluations on 
vote choice at different points of the modifying variables. This is necessary because it is 
possible for the total effect of economic conditions on individual vote choice to be 
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significant for particular values of the conditioning variables even though the coefficients 
of the interaction terms are statistically insignificant (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). 
 
II. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Lifetime Economic Experience and Education 
 
Much of the economic voting literature tends to treat the electorate as 
homogeneous in its response to economic fluctuations (Haller and Norpoth 1994; 
Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Many individuals-level studies treat the voters as 
homogeneous (Fiorina 1978, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; 
Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Norpoth 1996). In particular, aggregate-level studies 
assume that macro-economic indicators reflect the economic perception of the whole 
population. Macro-economic indicators, however, might not accurately represent 
different perceptions of economic conditions among diverse groups in a particular 
society. Recent economic voting research has paid more attention to the heterogeneity of 
the electorate (Duch 2001; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Gomez and Wilson 2001, 
2006; Hibbs et al. 1982; Krause 1997; Weatherford 1983). These scholars have taken 
account of individual differences in class and trust in government, while paying particular 
attention to information (or sophistication). Duch, Krause, and Weatherford argue that 
less informed voters are more likely to be involved in pocketbook voting than in 
sociotropic voting, while Gomez and Wilson contend the exact opposite.   
I argue that better educated voters engage in both sociotropic and pocketbook 
voting in Korea and Taiwan, while less educated voters are more likely to be involved in 
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only sociotropic voting. National economic conditions are generally more available and 
accessible than personal economic conditions. Linking the nation’s well-being to 
governmental actions does not require sophisticated cognitive skills because the 
government decides economic policies and thus is responsible for the policy outcomes 
(Gomez and Wilson 2001). On the other hand, it is harder to recognize the political 
relevance of personal economic situations since personal needs or experiences are 
“morselized” or isolated from the public arena (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 2006; Kinder 
and Kiewiet 1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). Scholars who find a null 
effect of personal economic conditions on individual vote choice maintain that personal 
economic situations matter for individual lives but not for politics (Kinder and Kiewiet 
1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). In this view, personal economic well-
being plays a significant role in electoral decisions only when individuals can clearly see 
political relevance of their own economic conditions (Feldman 1982; Gomez and Wilson 
2001, 2006; Lau and Sears 1981; Sears and Lau 1983). Therefore, voters with higher 
cognitive abilities will be more likely to be involved in pocketbook voting than voters 
with lesser cognitive abilities.   
 Lifetime economic experience is another intervening factor. Lifetime economic 
experience has particular importance in a country where voters have experienced one-
party dominance. Voters who have experienced high economic prosperity under the 
dominant party are less likely to vote against the incumbent party, even when they 
witness a short-term economic downturn (Magaloni 1999). Closely correlated with age, 
lifetime economic experience captures not only different economic experiences but also 
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diverse social and political experiences across ages. For the Korean cases considered 
above the correlations between age and lifetime economic experience were -.764 in 1992, 
-.776 in 1997, and -.395 in 2002. For the Taiwanese case the correlations were .037 in 
1996, .453 in 2000, and .699 in 2004. These correlations are all statistically significant. 
Lifetime economic experience was negatively related with age by indicating that the 
elderly witnessed a worse average economic growth than the young in Korea. On the 
other hand, positive correlations between the two suggest that the elderly enjoyed more 
economic prosperity than their counterparts in Taiwan. 
 
III. Research Design: Data, Variables, and Models 
  
To examine the heterogeneity of the electorate in Korea and Taiwan, I study two 
Korean presidential elections (1992 and 1997)31 and three Taiwanese presidential 
elections (1996, 2000, and 2004). I analyze the same post election survey data used in 
Chapters 4 and 5 using MNP regressions for the 1992 and 1997 Korean presidential 
elections, and the 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese presidential elections. I use a probit 
regression for the 2004 Taiwanese election. In addition to all the variables specified in 
the previous models, I include interaction terms between economic evaluations and 
lifetime economic experience, as well as between economic evaluations and education.  
  
                                                 
31 The 2002 Korean presidential election is excluded in the analyses since sociotropic and pocketbook 
evaluation variables are not available. 
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IV. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Korea 
 
1. The 1992 Korean Presidential Election 
  
 The 1992 election was the first presidential election with no soldier-turned-
politician from previous authoritarian regimes running as a presidential candidate. Kim 
Young-sam, a previous opposition leader, ran for the election as the ruling party 
candidate and won the election against Kim Dae-jung, the main opposition candidate. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated little evidence of economic voting in the 1992 Korean 
presidential election. Even though sociotropic evaluation was statistically significant, the 
direction of the coefficient was negative, which indicates that voters who perceived the 
national economy as worsening were more likely to vote for the incumbent party 
candidate rather than the challengers. Table 6-1 shows the results of multinomial probit 
regression testing the interactive relationships between economic evaluations and both 
education and long-term economic experience. The results seem to support the null effect 
of economic evaluations. Neither sociotropic nor pocketbook evaluation is statistically 
significant. The coefficients and significance of both sociotropic and pocketbook 
evaluations themselves, however, are not very meaningful since they are valid only when 
education and economic experiences are zero, which is rarely true. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms identify the nature of interactive relationships. The insignificant 
coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 6-1 seem to indicate that interactive 
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relationships between lifetime economic experience and economic evaluations and 
between education and economic evaluations did not exist in this election.  
 
Table 6-1. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1992 Presidential Election 
(Economic experience and Educational Heterogeneity Model) 
 
Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ 
Kim Young-sam (KYS) 
Chung Ju-yung (CJY)/ 
Kim Young-sam (KYS) 
Variables 













Unification 1 (c) 



























































Log Likelihood -269.958 
N 938 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Kim Young-sam are normalized at zero. 2. 
Marginal effects (∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the 
independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (a) Likeability 
difference between KYS and KDJ. 4. (b) Likeability difference between KYS and CJY. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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 As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the insignificance of interaction 
terms does not discard the possibility of interactive relationships between economic 
conditions and both education and lifetime economic experience until the total effects of 
economic conditions at different values of conditioning variables are examined. I pay 
particular attention to total effects of economic conditions, considering education and 
lifetime economic experience together. Tables 6-2 and 6-3 present the total effect of 
economic evaluations on individual vote choice in the 1992 election between Kim Dae-
jung and Kim Young-sam, considering both lifetime economic experience and education 
together at their various points.  
 
Table 6-2. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
 Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and KYS in 1992 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
 Even though there seems little evidence of interactive relationships between 
economic evaluations and the conditioning variables in Table 6-1, the results in Table 6-2 
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show that lifetime economic experience and education jointly mediated the effect of 
economic conditions. Voters who experienced worse economic conditions over their 
lifetimes and achieved higher education levels tended to be more likely to vote based on 
their sociotropic evaluation. As found in Chapter 4, however, they were more likely to 
vote for the incumbent candidate, Kim Young-sam, when they viewed the national 
economy as worsening, which is not an ordinary economic voting pattern. Considering 
their higher levels of education, however, they might have thought that electing Kim 
Young-sam could achieve two things. The first was that they felt they may have felt they 
were punishing the incumbent, since Kim Young-sam was an opposition candidate 
previously. The second was that they avoided the risk of electing an untested opposition 
party candidate. In other words, Kim Young-sam was a better choice for less 
economically fortunate but better educated voters under a dominant one-party system that 
hindered voters from penalizing the incumbent. Contrary to the expectations, there was 
no evidence of sociotropic effects among the less educated and economically less 
fortunate. 
 As expected, however, voters who witnessed worse economic conditions and 
attained higher education were more likely to undertake pocketbook voting in choosing 
between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam. Regarding their personal economic 
conditions, they behaved like ordinary economic voters who punish the incumbent for 
personal economic misfortune. There is no evidence of any pocketbook voting among the 
less educated but strong evidence of this phenomenon among the more educated. 
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Table 6-3. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
 Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and KYS in 1992 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
  
In selecting between Chung Ju-yung and Kim Young-sam, voters who 
experienced the worst economic conditions throughout their lifetime and attained middle 
levels of education tended to be engaged in sociotropic voting but in the opposite way 
than might be expected (Table 6-4). They were more likely to vote for the incumbent 
party candidate during the poor economic performance. The effect of pocketbook 
evaluation was not affected by lifetime economic experience or education. In other 
words, there was no substantial evidence of pocketbook voting across all levels of 
education and different lifetime economic experiences in selecting between Chung Ju-
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Table 6-4. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
 Experience and Education on Vote Choice between CJY and KYS in 1992 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 












































 In sum, the more educated and worse-off were more likely to be involved in 
pocketbook voting in 1992. There was no evidence of sociotropic or pocketbook voting 
among the less or the least educated, regardless of their lifetime economic experience. In 
addition, the coefficients of sociotropic evaluation are negative, indicating that voters 
rewarded the incumbent party candidate for a worse economic performance. The 
interpretation for sociotropic effects by education and lifetime economic experience is 
thus indefinite. The opposite sign of sociotropic evaluation may be a result of the unique 
circumstances of the 1992 presidential election, which involved choosing between a 
never-tested opposition party candidate and a previous opposition party leader running as 
the dominant party candidate.  
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2. The 1997 Presidential Election 
The presidential election in 1997 occurred in the middle of an economic crisis. 
This election was the first election that turned the ruling party out of presidential power. 
The ruling party candidate, Lee Hoe-chang, lost the election against an opposition party 
candidate, Kim Dae-jung, by a narrow margin. More than 80 percent of the respondents 
to the post-election survey in 1997 listed the economy as the most important problem 
Korea faced (see Table 4-1 in Chapter 4). However, the results in Chapter 4 show that 
voters based their vote choice on neither their perception of short-term personal and 
national economic conditions nor long-term economic experience. Attribution of 
responsibility for the economic crisis was the only economy-related variable that 
influenced individual vote choice in 1997. Table 6-5 also suggests that no interaction 
terms are statistically significant, which indicates that there was no substantial interactive 
relationship between economic evaluations and education or between economic 
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Table 6-5. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1997 Presidential Election  
(Economic experience and Educational Heterogeneity Model) 
 
Kim Dae-jung (KDJ)/ 
Lee Hoe-chang (LHC) 
Rhee In-je (RIJ)/ 
Lee Hoe-chang (LHC) 
Variables 











Likeability of LHC (e) 
Likeability of KDJ (f) 




























































Log Likelihood -.439.155 
N 930 
Note: 1. Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lee Hoe-chang are normalized at zero. 2. 
Marginal effects (∆) indicate the change in the predicted probability of Y at the means of the 
independent variables and discrete change of dichotomous variables from 0 to 1. 3. (c) is a 
dummy for likeability of Lee Hoe-chang.  4. (d) is a dummy for likeability of Kim Dae-jung. 5. 
(e) is a dummy for likeability of Rhee In-je. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
Similarly to the results in 1992, education and lifetime economic experience did 
not seem to individually alter the effect of economic evaluations but instead jointly 
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conditioned the effect. When I consider the effect of economic conditions on individual 
vote choice at different values of education and lifetime economic experience, Table 6-6 
shows, voters who were less educated and experienced an average economic growth 
throughout their lifetimes were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting. When 
they perceived the national economy as worsening in the previous two years, they were 
more likely to vote for the challenger, Kim Dae-jung, instead of the incumbent Lee Hoe-
chang. Contrary to the results of sociotropic effects in 1992, there was a clear evidence of 
sociotropic voting among the less educated who experienced moderate prosperity but not 
among the more educated. The effect of pocketbook evaluation was not affected by 
education or lifetime economic experience in the choice between Kim Dae-jung and Lee 
Hoe-chang. 
 
Table 6-6. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
 Experience and Education on Vote Choice between KDJ and LHC in 1997 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 










































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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To the contrary, different educational achievements and lifetime economic 
experiences made a difference in the effect of pocketbook evaluation on vote choice 
between Rhee In-je and Lee Hoe-chang in 1997. Consistent with the findings regarding 
the 1992 election, the more educated and less economically fortunate had a greater 
likelihood of voting on the basis of short-term personal economic conditions. If they 
perceived that their personal economic situations worsened over the previous two years, 
they were more likely to vote for the challenger (Rhee In-je) than the incumbent party 
candidate (Lee Hoe-chang). Sociotropic evaluation did not make much difference in 
candidate preference among individuals who differed in education and lifetime economic 
experience when they chose between Rhee and Lee. 
 
Table 6-7. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between RIJ and LHC in 1997 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 










































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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 The findings about the heterogeneity of Korean voters in the 1992 and 1997 
presidential elections clearly support the hypothesis on pocketbook effects, while the 
findings on the effects of sociotropic evaluation partially hold up the sociotropic 
hypothesis. Education and lifetime economic experience, however, jointly affect the 
impact of economic evaluations. Only the better educated but economically less fortunate 
were involved in pocketbook voting in both elections. On the other hand, there was a 
strong sociotropic effect among the less educated with medium economic success over 
their entire lives, but not among the most educated, in 1997. Finally, even after 
introducing the interaction terms, regional identity played an important role in 
determining individual vote choice in both Korean presidential elections. 
 
V. Heterogeneity of the Electorate in Taiwan 
 
1. The 1996 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
 The 1996 presidential election in Taiwan was won by the incumbent Lee Teng-
hui over the three challengers, Peng Ming-min, Lin Yang-kang, and Chen Li-an. 
Sociotropic evaluation was a significant factor determining vote choice between Lin 
Yang-kang and Lee Teng-hui, but not between Peng Ming-min and Lee Teng-hui in this 
election. Voters who thought the national economy was worsening over the previous year 
were more likely to vote for the challenger Lin than the incumbent Lee. There was no 
evidence of pocketbook voting in 1996. However, these results do not rule out the 
possibility that a certain group of voters considered national or personal economic 
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situations in their electoral choice between Peng and Lee. Even after accounting for the 
heterogeneity of the voters in Table 6-8, however, we see little evidence of either 
sociotropic or pocketbook voting. None of the interactions is statistically significant. In 
other words, neither education nor lifetime economic experience seemed to make any 
difference in the effects of economic evaluations on individual vote choice in the 1996 
presidential election. 
  
Table 6-8. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 1996 Presidential Election            
 
Peng/Lee Lin/Lee Variables 























































Log Likelihood -293.427 
N 890 
Note: Coefficients for incumbent Lee are normalized at zero.  
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
  140 
As found in both Korean cases, however, education and lifetime economic 
experience might jointly result in significant variations in economic voting at their 
different values in the Taiwanese cases. Table 6-9 shows that the better educated who did 
not witness much prosperity were more likely to be involved in pocketbook, but not 
sociotropic, voting when they chose between Peng and Lee. When they perceived that 
their personal economic conditions worsened over the previous year, they were inclined 
to vote for challenger Peng. The more educated and economically least fortunate were 
even more inclined to do so. The risk associated with voting for a never-tested opposition 
candidate was much less for them than others who experienced higher prosperity under 
the dominant party.  
 
Table 6-9. Total Effects of Pocketbook Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Peng and Lee in 1996 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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On the other hand, Table 6-10 suggests that education and lifetime economic 
experience made a significant difference in sociotropic, but not pocketbook, voting when 
choosing between Lin and Lee. As expected, sociotropic voting was more common 
across different educational groups than pocketbook voting, which was limited to the 
more educated. However, the least educated were not even engaged in sociotropic voting, 
regardless of their economic experience. At the same time, the highly educated who had 
experienced the least amount of economic prosperity were most likely to vote based on 
their perception of the national economic conditions when they faced the alternative 
between Lin and Lee. As expected, insignificant coefficients of interaction and 
constitutive terms does not mean a null effect of economic conditions on individual vote 
choice. It is important to examine the effects of economic conditions at various points of 
modifying variables to study the heterogeneity of economic voting behavior. 
 
Table 6-10. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Lin and Lee in1996 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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2. The 2000 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
 The KMT lost presidential power for the first time in the 2000 presidential 
election, which transferred presidential power to an opposition party, the DPP. Chen 
Shui-bian defeated the incumbent party candidate, Lien, receiving 39.3% of the votes, 
followed by James Soong who was an independent candidate and received 37.5% of the 
votes. The results in Chapter 5 suggest that short-term economic conditions did not 
significantly contribute to the power shift. Voters who enjoyed considerable prosperity 
under the KMT’s fifty-year rule, however, were less likely to withdraw their support for 
the KMT.  
 
Table 6-11. Multinomial Probit Estimates for the 2000 Presidential Election            
 
Chen/Lien Soong/Lien Variables 
M.L.E. (S.E.) M.L.E. (S.E.) 
Economic Variables 
Sociotropic 














































Log Likelihood -601.239 
N 1082 
Note: Coefficients for incumbent party candidate Lien are normalized at zero. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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 After taking account of the heterogeneity of voters, the results of the interaction 
terms in Table 6-11 indicate that lifetime economic experience affected the impact of 
sociotropic evaluations on individual vote choice in 2000, while education did not.32  
 
Table 6-12. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Chen and Lien in 2000 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
However, Tables 6-12 and 6-13 show that education made a significant difference in 
sociotropic voting in conjunction with lifetime economic experience. First, when 
considering the alternatives between Chen and Lien, voters who witnessed less economic 
growth throughout their lives did not behave like ordinary economic voters. When they 
perceived that the national economy was worse, they were more likely to vote for the 
incumbent party candidate (Lien) rather than the challenger (Chen) across all education 
levels. The least educated who had witnessed the least economic growth were most likely 
                                                 
32 A pocketbook evaluation variable is not available in the 2000 presidential election survey. Therefore, I 
examine only interactive relationship between sociotropic evaluation and both education and life-time 
economic experience in 2000.  
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to vote for the incumbent party candidate. Meanwhile, voters who had experienced long-
term prosperity and were more educated were more likely to punish the incumbent party 
candidate for a short-term economic downturn. 
 
Table 6-13. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Soong and Lien in 2000 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
Voters who witnessed a high average economic growth showed similar behavioral 
patterns when they chose between Soong and Lien as when they faced the alternatives 
between Chen and Lien (Table 6-13). Voters who witnessed higher economic growth 
throughout their lives were more likely to withdraw their support for the incumbent party 
due to a shot-term economic recession. This phenomenon held true across all education 
levels except for the highest education group. These results contrast with the expectation 
that voters who witnessed higher economic growth under KMT dominance would be less 
likely to respond to short-term economic fluctuations. As Diamond (2001) pointed out, 
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Taiwanese voters might have a desire for a political change after they had experienced a 
long economic growth.  
 
3. The 2004 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
The 2004 election was the first presidential election after the opposition party, 
DPP, captured presidential power in 2000. Unlike in the previous elections, therefore, 
voters in 2004 could evaluate both parties, KMT and DPP, on the basis of economic 
performance in 2004. Even after experiencing an unprecedented economic recession 
during the first term of President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwanese voters reelected the 
incumbent over the challenger, Lien Chan. The significance coefficient of sociotropic 
evaluation as demonstrated in Chapter 5 suggests that voters considered national 
economic conditions for their electoral choice. I did not, however, observe any evidence 
of pocketbook voting in this election. Even after considering the heterogeneity of the 
electorate in education and lifetime economic experience, there was little sign of 
pocketbook voting. No interaction term involving pocketbook evaluation is statistically 
significant, which implies that even different lifetime economic experience and 
educational attainments might have not affected the impact of pocketbook evaluation on 
individual vote choice for this election. Meanwhile, the interaction term between 
sociotropic evaluation and lifetime economic experience is statistically significant, 
indicating that lifetime economic experience conditioned the effect of sociotropic 
evaluation on individual vote choice.  
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Log Likelihood -256.964 
LR 2χ  1118.698** 
Pseudo 2R  .685 
% Predicted Correctly 90.4% 
% Reduction in Error 79.4% 
N 1182 
Note: Coefficients for incumbent Chen are normalized at zero. 
*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
 
Table 6-15 also shows that there is a significant difference in sociotropic voting 
across different lifetime economic experiences. Changes in the effects of sociotropic 
evaluation across different education levels indicate that education was also a 
conditioning factor of sociotropic voting when considered with lifetime economic 
experience. As with the results from 2000, voters who witnessed higher economic growth 
throughout their lives were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting across all 
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education levels but more so among the less educated. In other words, the higher the 
economic prosperity voters experienced, the more responsive they were to short-term 
economic declines. The national economic conditions Taiwanese voters experienced 
throughout most of their lives were attributed to the KMT government, since the KMT 
was the only party that had governed until 2000. Therefore, if voters witnessed higher 
economic growth during the KMT rule but worse economic conditions after the DPP took 
over, they were more likely to punish the incumbent Chen. In other words, voters who 
have been through a power alternation between parties are able to clearly differentiate 
those parties in terms of economic performance and vote accordingly. As expected, 
sociotropic voting was common to all educational groups that witnessed more prosperity 
in their lives but was most likely among the least educated who had experienced the 
highest economic growth.   
  
Table 6-15. Total Effects of Sociotropic Evaluation as a Function of Economic 
Experience and Education on Vote Choice between Lien and Chen in 2004 
 
Level of Education 
Economic Experience 
1 2 3 4 








































*Significant at p<=.05     **Significant at p<=.01 
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The Taiwanese cases also show that education and lifetime economic experience 
jointly affected the impact of economic evaluations on individual vote choice. The only 
evidence of pocketbook voting existed among the more educated, who went through less 
than mediocre economic growth in 1996. On the other hand, sociotropic voting occurred 
across different educational groups and diverse lifetime economic experiences in all three 
elections. Sociotropic voting was stronger among the more educated who had enjoyed 
less long-term economic growth in the 1996 election, whereas it was stronger among the 
less educated who had witnessed higher long-term economic growth in both the 2000 and 




This chapter studied what types of voters were more likely to be involved in 
sociotropic or pocketbook voting in both Korea and Taiwan by focusing on how 
education and lifetime economic experience affected the impact of economic evaluations 
on individual electoral choices. Even after taking account of population heterogeneity, 
there seems little evidence of pocketbook and sociotropic voting in either Korea or 
Taiwan. The various effects of economic evaluations across different groups were only 
evident when the two modifying variables of education and lifetime economic experience 
were considered together at their different values. Pocketbook voting occurred only 
among the more educated who experienced less than average economic growth in both 
countries. Sociotropic voting was much more common than pocketbook voting among 
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both more- and less-educated voters, even though the effects were also conditioned by 
lifetime economic experience. These results tend to support the argument that pocketbook 
voting requires more cognitive skills to link personal economic conditions to 
governmental actions, while sociotropic voting does not (Gomez and Wilson 2001, 
2006). Therefore, personal economic conditions are significant in politics only when 
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
Based on the assumption that attitudes must be available, accessible, and 
distinctive to have relevance to political behavior, particularly vote choice, the previous 
chapters have answered the following questions.  
(1) How did preexisting social cleavages based on social identity in Korea and 
Taiwan influence the attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of 
both economic conditions and identity issues—regional identity in Korea and 
ethnic/national identity in Taiwan? 
(2) How did the attitude availability, accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic 
conditions and identity issues influence the relevance of those factors for 
individual vote choice in the two countries? 
(3) How did individuals who vary in their educational and lifetime economic 
experiences respond to short-term economic fluctuations? 
 
Social divisions by regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan 
were translated into political party systems after democratization. Political parties in 
Korea were founded by regional leaders, based on one-sided support from their regions, 
Cholla and Kyongsang in particular. Even though the ruling party changed its name from 
election to election, all the parties were based in the Kyongsang region and had political 
leaders from Kyongsang. The Taiwanese party system was structured by the issue of 
national identity. As the KMT, which was led by mainlanders from China, monopolized 
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political power for over 40 years, the DPP proclaimed itself as the Taiwanese party and 
supported Taiwan’s independence from China. The main cause of the intra-party splits of 
the KMT during the 1990s was political leaders’ conflicts on national identity. As 
political parties in both countries clearly represented social and political cleavages, 
attitudes toward those cleavages were not only available and accessible but also 
distinctive to voters. Therefore, regional identity in Korea and national identity in Taiwan 
have determined individual vote choice in each country.   
However, the effects of social identity have also depended on how distinctive the 
candidates were in terms of identity issues. National identity in Taiwan, for example, did 
not influence the vote choice between the KMT candidate Lee and the independent 
candidate Lin in 1996, while significantly affecting vote choice between Lee and the DPP 
candidate Peng. Even in 2000, national identity had a greater effect in selecting between 
the KMT candidate, Lien, and the independent Soong than in choosing between Lien and 
Chen, which was due to Chen’s and Lien’s moderate positions on national identity. In 
other words, the major differences between the DPP and the KMT were blurred in 2000. 
After Lee Teng-hui defected from the KMT and the two camps—the “pan blue” and the 
“pan-green”—were formed, however, voters clearly distinguished the two camps in terms 
of national identity and the issue of Taiwan independence in the 2004 election.  
On the other hand, economic conditions were available and accessible but not 
distinctive in the first two elections considered in each country. Voters in both countries 
tended to be very concerned about the economy, but they did not have a clear alternative 
to the dominant party. Not only was the economy under the dominant party in both 
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countries was very successful for over 40 years but voters also did not know much about 
the opposition parties’ ability to govern. This prevented voters from evaluating parties on 
the basis of economic performance even after they experienced a short-term economic 
downturn. The 1997 Korean presidential election and the 2000 Taiwanese presidential 
election brought the first alternation of power in the highest position in the nation. The 
opposition parties got a chance to be tested and prove their governability until the next 
election, when voters could have a record of the performance of both the previously 
dominant and the opposition parties. Therefore, voters could assess and compare each 
party’s performance and vote based on their assessment.  
As expected, there was little evidence of either sociotropic or pocketbook voting 
in the first two elections in both countries. Voters could not distinguish the parties in 
terms of their economic performance since there had been only one party in power. 
Furthermore, uncertainty about the capability of opposition parties increased the risk of 
casting out the incumbent based on a short-term economic decline. Once voters witnessed 
long-time opposition parties in power and could differentiate parties by economic 
performance, however, they voted based on the evaluation of short-term economic 
change. Sociotropic evaluation affected individual vote choice in the 2002 Korean 
presidential election and in the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election. Even then, there 
was no sign of pocketbook voting.  
Another economic variable controlled was lifetime economic experience 
measured by the average economic growth experienced by each individual from age 10. 
While long-term economic experience influenced individual voting behavior in Taiwan, 
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it did not in Korea. Voters who enjoyed high economic growth during the KMT rule in 
Taiwan were more likely to support the KMT in the 1996 and 2000 Taiwanese 
presidential elections. While voters did not reward or punish the incumbent for a short-
term economic change, they rewarded the incumbent for long-term economic success. 
When the DPP became the incumbent in 2004, lifetime economic experience did not have 
a significant effect on individual vote choice. Once Taiwanese voters experienced an 
opposition party in power, they relied on short-term economic changes to make their 
electoral choices. 
Even though Korean party system was categorized as a one-party dominant 
system, the succession of the ruling parties was confusing. Every ruling party in Korea 
was launched as an effort to detach itself from a former leaders’ mishap, while there was 
no substantial change in their personnel or policy platforms. The ruling parties also made 
coalitions with opposition parties for electoral advantage. Compared with Taiwanese 
voters, who had only one ruling party, the KMT, Korean voters found it difficult to assign 
the responsibility for long-term economic conditions to the ruling party. In short, the 
different effects of lifetime economic experience in Korea and Taiwan imply that the 
clarity of responsibility mediated the effect of long-term economic experience on 
individual vote choice.  
 This study found heterogeneous economic voting behavior across elections in 
both countries. We can also expect heterogeneous economic voting behavior among 
individuals because individuals also have varying degrees of attitude availability, 
accessibility, and distinctiveness of economic conditions. Chapter 6 examined how 
  154 
education and lifetime economic experience interact with economic evaluations to 
influence individual vote choice. Education and lifetime economic experience did not 
influence the effect of economic conditions independently, but they jointly affected the 
significance of economic voting. As expected, the more educated who did not witness 
much prosperity were more likely to be engaged in pocketbook voting in both countries. 
On the other hand, the less educated were more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting 
in Korea. The more educated voters who had experienced smaller economic growth were 
more likely to be involved in sociotropic voting in the 1996 Taiwanese presidential 
election. To the contrary, Taiwanese voters who enjoyed higher economic growth across 
all education levels were more likely to vote based on short-term economic recessions in 
2000 and 2004. In sum, when the population is regarded as homogeneous, there was little 
evidence of economic voting, pocketbook voting in particular, in the first two elections of 
both countries. Considering individual differences in education and lifetime economic 
experience together, I found that a certain subset of the population was more likely to 
vote based on short-term economic evaluations than others.  
 My dissertation finds that economic voting was far less generalizable in Korea 
and Taiwan, even though recent elections showed some evidence of economic, 
particularly sociotropic, voting. As symbolic politics argues, individuals are not all 
egocentric and materialistic rather “public regarding” in the public arena (Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1979; Sears and Funk 1991; Sears and Lau 1983). When individual voters are 
emotionally attached to symbols, such as their own identity, a region, or the nation, 
individual political preferences tend to be formed by individual political values 
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embedded in a society and affective responses to salient symbols, not personal needs or 
self-interest. Voters in Korea and Taiwan learned emotional or affective responses to 
regional/national identity early in life. These learned responses persist through adult life 
and influence the adult’s attitudes toward politics, in much the same way as party 
identification in the United States. Social identity cues compete with other conflicting or 
confirming cues such as issues and candidates. Individuals, however, tend to interpret 
issues and candidates in terms of strong symbolic predispositions, keeping cognitive and 
affective consistency, as shown by the fact that attitudes toward social identity in both 
countries are closely linked to other attitudes. Attitudes about social identity in Korea and 
Taiwan have been the more accessible and distinctive than attitudes about economic 
conditions so that social identity had the better chance of affecting individual candidate 
preferences. 
The higher accessibility of economic problems produced the significance of 
sociotropic evaluation in recent elections in both countries after just one-term of the 
previous opposition party candidate in office. This result implies that we might observe 
more economic voting in future elections in both countries since voters now can 
distinguish parties in terms of economic performance. On the other hand, since the 
accessibility and distinctiveness of national identity are decreasing in Taiwan, we can 
expect a marginal effect of identity issues. Whenever military threats from China become 
an issue, however, national identity can be the most accessible and distinctive issue again 
since the parties still differ in their final objectives for Taiwan’s destiny and will try to 
take advantage of the issue to win elections. For regional identity in Korea, when all the 
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“three Kims” retired from politics along with a generational change of both political 
figures and the electorate, many scholars expected the end of regionalism. Contrary to 
this expectation, regionalism seemed more significant than ever in the 2002 presidential 
election. New political cleavages around new issues, such as the country’s relationship 
with North Korea, overlapped with the existing regional cleavage rather than crosscut it. 
However, individual positions of new issues are much more vulnerable to changing 
environments. Therefore, once individual opinions on new issues and regional identity 
become separated, regional identity might lose its significance for individual electoral 
decisions since the salience of regional identity itself started to die out with the departure 
of charismatic regional leaders and generational replacement.  
 Previous voting behavior models have sought to find generalizable effects of 
particular variables, overlooking their varying effects across countries, elections, and 
individuals. Utilizing the fundamental assumption of information-processing models, this 
dissertation has taken account of variations in the availability, accessibility, and 
distinctiveness of attitudes to help explain when and why certain variables have had a 
significant effect on individual vote choice in a specific context. I paid particular 
attention to the distinctiveness between the candidates in terms of an issue. Finally, 
incorporating social and political contexts, such as the existence of ethno-cultural 
cleavages, I have provided a better understanding of why given factors are available, 
accessible, and distinctive for individual voters. This research also sheds new light on the 
sociological and the economic voting model by providing new interpretations through 
social cognitive psychology.  
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Appendix I. Tables 
 
Table AI-1. Presidential Candidates’ Vote Shares by Regions in Korea (1952-2002) 
























Cheju Std Mean 
Lee, SM 82.3 88.0 92.4 86.7 82.4 65.9 73.6 75.0 55.4 75.7 11.2 74.6 1952 
Cho, BA 10.3 6.0 2.7 5.8 7.3 15.4 8.9 10.6 23.0 6.4 5.8 11.4 
Lee, SM 63.3 77.1 90.8 86.1 77.1 60.2 72.1 55.3 62.3 81.9 12.0 70.0 1956 
Cho, BA 36.7 22.9 9.2 13.9 22.9 39.8 27.9 44.7 37.7 12.1 11.6 27.6 
Park, CH 30.2 33.1 39.6 39.8 40.9 49.4 57.2 55.6 57.6 69.9 12.4 46.4 1963 
Yun, BS 65.1 56.9 49.1 48.2 49.4 41.5 35.9 36.1 35.3 22.3 13.2 45.1 
Park, CH 45.2 41.0 51.3 46.6 45.4 42.3 44.6 64.0 67.3 56.5 9.8 48.8 1967 
Yun, BS 51.3 52.6 41.7 43.6 46.8 48.9 46.6 26.4 25.5 32.1 10.3 40.9 
Park, CH 40.0 48.9 59.8 57.3 53.5 35.5 34.4 75.6 66.9 56.9 13.5 51.1 1971 
Kim DJ 59.4 49.5 38.8 40.7 44.4 61.5 62.8 23.3 32.1 41.4 13.1 45.3 
Roh, TW 29.9 41.0 59.3 46.9 26.2 14.1 7.3 68.1 36.6 49.8 20.3 36.6 
Kim, YS 29.1 28.1 26.1 28.2 16.1 1.5 1.0 26.5 53.7 26.8 16.4 28.0 
1987 
Kim, DJ 32.6 22.1 8.8 11.0 12.4 83.5 91.3 2.5 6.9 18.6 33.5 27.0 
Kim, YS 36.4 36.6 41.5 38.3 36.3 5.7 3.5 62.5 72.8 40.0 22.5 42.0 1992 
Kim, DJ 37.7 31.9 15.5 26.0 28.6 89.1 93.4 8.8 10.9 32.9 30.4 33.8 
Kim, DJ 44.9 39.1 23.8 37.4 46.7 92.3 95.9 13.1 13.7 40.6 20.4 40.3 1997 
Lee, HC 40.9 35.7 43.32 30.8 26.4 4.5 2.5 67.3 54.2 36.6 16.4 38.7 
Roh, MY 51.3 50.5 41.5 50.4 53.4 91.6 94.1 20.2 29.4 56.1 23.5 48.9 2002 
Lee, HC 44.3 44.3 52.5 42.9 40.1 6.2 4.1 75.5 65.3 39.9 22.4 46.6 
Source: Central Election Management Committee, The History of Elections in Korea (www. nec.go.kr/content.jsp).  
Note: 1. Chungbuk is the northern party of Chungchong. 2. Chungnam is the southern part of Chungchong. 3. Chunbuk is the northern part 
of Cholla. 4. Chunnam is the southern part of Cholla. 5. Kyongbuk is the northern part of Kyongsang. 6. Kyongnam is the 
southern part of Kyongsang. 
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Table AI-2. Regimes and Party System Change in Korea (1948-current) 
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Source: Choe, Yonhyok. 2003. p. 31 (Table 3-1) from 1948 to 2000. Updated by the author from 
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• PFP formed in 2000 
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Pan-green:   
a coalition of DPP and 
TSU (Taiwan Solidarity 
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• Short-lived multiparty 
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• Movement toward a 
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Table AI-4. Vote Shares by Party in Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan (1992-2004) 
 
Election Year KMT DPP NP PFP TSU Other 
1992 60.0% 31.0% N/A N/A N/A 9.0% 
1995 46.1 33.2 13.0 N/A N/A 7.8 
1998 46.4 29.6 7.1 N/A N/A 17.0 
2001 28.6 33.4 2.6 18.6 7.8 9.1 
2004 34.9 38.0 .1 14.8 8.3 4.0 
Source: Taiwan Central Election Commission 
 
Table AI-5. The Result of the 1992 Korean Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Kim Young-sam DLP 42% 
Kim Dae-jung PPD 34 
Chung Ju-yung UPP 16 




Table AI-6. Regional Differences in Support for the Three-Party Merger in the 1992 
Korean Presidential Election 
 
Region Mean (Std.) 
Cholla 2.277 (1.051) 
Kyongsang 3.069 (1.119) 
Other regions 2.900 (1.115 ) 
 F = 40.73 (p = .000) 
Note: The differences between Cholla and other regions, including Kyongsang, are significant at 
.01 level, while the difference between Kyongsang and other regions is not statistically significant 
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Table AI-7. Regional Differences in PID in the 1992, 1997, and 2002 Korean 
Presidential Elections: Proportion of Respondents Who Were Closer to 
Government-Party Orientation  
 
Region Mean (S.E.) in 1992 Mean (S.E.) in 1997 Mean (S.E.) in 2002 
Cholla .092 (.290) .041 (.199) .500 (.501) 
Kyongsang .554 (.498) .408 (.492) .166 (.373) 
Other Regions .379 (.486) .263(.441) .241 (.428) 
F-TEST F=76.93 (p= .000) F = 58.33 (p= .000) F = 56.93 (p= .000) 
Note: All the differences between the regions are statistically significant at .01 level. 
 
 
Table AI-8. The Result of the 1997 Korean Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Lee Hoe-chang NKP 38.7% 
Kim Dae-jung NCNP 40.3 
Rhee In-je NPP 19.2 




Table AI-9. The Result of the 2002 Korean Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Roh Moo-hyun NMDP 48.9% 
Lee Hoe-chang GNP 46.6 
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Table AI-10. Distribution of Retrospective Economic Evaluations in the 1992 and 1997 
Korean Presidential Elections 
 
1992 (percent) 1997 (percent)  
Sociotropic Pocketbook Sociotropic Pocketbook 
Much better 2.90% 1.17% .75% 1.66% 
Better 7.62 14.42 2.24 2.57 
About the 
same 
27.20 58.00 14.04 30.90 
Worse 30.38 16.67 34.30 33.80 
Much worse 32.72 9.75 48.67 31.06 
N 1195 1200 1204 1204 
Note: No economic evaluation variables in 2002. 
 
 
Table AI-11. Independence-Unification Stance by Party in Taiwan (1996-2004) 
Year Candidate (Party) Mean Std. Observation 
1996 Lee Teng-hui (KMT) 
Peng Ming-min (DPP) 
Lin Yang-kang (NP) 













2000 Lien Chan (KMT) 
Chen Shui-bian (DPP) 










2004 Lien Chan (KMT/pan-blue) 







Note: 1. A 3-point scale from independence (one) to unification (three) was used in 1996 and 
2000. An 11 point scale from independence (zero) to unification (ten) was used in 2004. 2. All the 
paired mean differences are statistically significant. 3. Lin Yang-kang was an independent 
candidate but endorsed by the NP. 
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Table AI-12. The Result of the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Lee Teng-hui KMT 54.00 
Peng Ming-min DPP 21.13 
Lin Yang-kang Independent* 14.90 
Chen Li-an Independent 9.98 
Source: Hsieh et al. 1998 
*indicates endorsement by the New Party. 
 
 
Table AI-13. The Result of the 2000 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Lien Chan KMT 23.10 
Chen Shui-bian DPP 39.30 




Table AI-14. Distribution of Retrospective Economic Evaluations in the 1996, 2000, and 
2004 Taiwanese Presidential Elections 
 
1996 (percent) 2004 (percent)  
Sociotropic Pocketbook 
2000* 
(percent) Sociotropic Pocketbook 
Much better 1.51% 1.44% 2.04% N/A N/A 
Better 8.20 8.94 12.25 26.61% 9.79% 
About the 
same 
28.04 61.14 23.85 38.51 63.18 
Worse 33.43 19.03 48.72 34.89 27.03 
Much worse 28.83 9.44 13.13 N/A N/A 
N 1391 1387 1371 1682 1670 
*No pocketbook evaluation variable in 2000. 
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Table AI-15. The Result of the 2004 Taiwanese Presidential Election 
 
Candidate Party Vote % 
Lien Chan KMT 49.89 
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Appendix II. Figures 
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